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growth.1 ICT interoperability means “the ability to transfer and
render useful data and other information across systems . . .
applications, or components.”2 To achieve interoperability,
firms must have access to and be able to use the precise information that defines the boundaries between ICT systems, that
is, the interfaces between them.3 Insofar as patents are issuing
on interface designs and components, many worry that they
will be used to impede interoperability.4 This Article considers
whether such patents are, in fact, impeding interoperability,
and if so, what should be done about it.
Part I explains the significance of interfaces and interoperability, various technical challenges involved in designing and
implementing interfaces, and the competitive importance of interoperability to various stakeholders. It also considers how intellectual property (IP) rules and IP strategies about interface
protection evolved over time and why patents eventually
emerged as an important source of IP protection. The factors
that motivate firms to seek patents for ICT interfaces (or not)
are complex and dynamic. Part I gives examples of interface
patents that have impacted interoperability.
Part II discusses the extensive array of policy options that
commentators, policymakers, and courts have considered as
possible responses to the exclusionary potential of ICT interface
patents. Subpart A considers proposals that would, in essence,
make interfaces unprotectable by patent law.5 Subpart B discusses ways in which patent rules might be tailored to facilitate
1. See, e.g., URS GASSER & JOHN PALFREY, BREAKING DOWN DIGITAL
BARRIERS: WHEN AND HOW ICT INTEROPERABILITY DRIVES INNOVATION 1
(2007), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/interop/pdfs/interop-breaking-barriers.pdf.
Gasser and Palfrey observe that it is very difficult to find anyone who speaks
out against interoperability. Id. It bears mentioning, however, that interoperability also enables viruses, worms, Trojan horses, spam, and other malware.
Id. at 2.
2. Id. at 4.
3. Cf. id. at 9 (explaining that the simplest approach to achieving technical interoperability is through “unilateral openness”).
4. See, e.g., INFORMATION SERVICES INDUSTRY DIVISION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE “STUDY GROUP ON THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF SOFTWARE AND
PROMOTION OF INNOVATION” (Oct. 11, 2005), http://www.meti.go.jp/english/
information/downloadfiles/051017LegalProtectionSoftware.pdf
[hereinafter
ISID INTERIM REPORT] (expressing concern about the exclusionary potency of
patents that can impede innovation in the software sector).
5. Part II.A offers an interpretation of the European Directive on the legal protection of computer programs as excluding interfaces from IP protection. See Council Directive 91/250, On the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42 (EC) [hereinafter Software Directive].
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interoperability. Subpart C explores some proposals to subject
interface patents to liability rules, such as awarding damages
instead of injunctive relief as to those who use patented interfaces to achieve interoperability. Subpart D considers antitrust
and competition law as a source of oversight of a dominant
firm’s refusal to license interface information and IP rights (if
any) in such information. In particular, it reviews the European Commission’s order requiring Microsoft to prepare documents providing extensive technical detail about Windows interfaces and to make this information available on reasonable
licensing terms to competitors in the work group server operating system (WGS-OS) market.6 Subpart E focuses on some private sector initiatives, including those undertaken by standardsetting organizations (SSOs), aimed at controlling the unbridled exclusionary power of interface patents by requiring
commitments to license such patents, insofar as they are essential to achieving interoperability, on royalty-free (RF) or reasonable and nondiscriminatory (RAND) terms.
Part III observes that there is a considerable amount of interoperability in today’s ICT environment, notwithstanding the
issuance of many interface patents and the dire predictions of
social harm that underlie proposals for strong regulatory responses to interface patents. There are generally adequate incentives for firms to make interface information available or license interface patents on reasonable terms. In view of this, it
does not seem necessary or appropriate to adopt strong measures, such as excluding interfaces from patent protection or
immunizing use of interface patents to achieve interoperability.
Interface patents pose the gravest risks for competition and follow-on innovation when exercise of such patents are essential
to interoperability, when the patents are held by established
firms with market power, and when there are incentives for
firms to enforce interface patents in a manner that provides the
opportunity for leveraging a dominant firm’s power in one
market into that of an adjacent market. If regulatory intervention of interface patents is appropriate at all, it should only be
undertaken in a targeted manner to address specific harms.
6. See Commission of the European Communities, Commission decision
of March 24, 2004, relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty
(Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft), Brussels, April 21, 2004, C(2004)900 final,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/
en.pdf [hereinafter Commission Decision]. The Commission’s order was affirmed in Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601.
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Yet, this Article also recommends some tailoring of patent
rules in a manner that is likely to foster greater ICT interoperability without undermining incentives to invest in development of innovative interfaces. This includes closer scrutiny of
patent applications that cover interface techniques, more rigorous disclosure of enablement of interface inventions, more
meaningful and cost-effective post-grant review of patent validity, and judicial rulings that antireverse engineering clauses in
mass-market licenses should not be enforceable.
I. THE ROLE OF IP LAW
IN THE PROTECTION OF INTERFACES
Intellectual property law often plays an important role in
regulating the use of ICT interfaces, but other factors also affect interoperability. To set the stage for contextualizing the
role of IP law in facilitating or blocking interoperability, Section A first offers some refined definitions of interfaces, interoperability, and related concepts, and then discusses incentives
that firms have to disclose interface information to enable interoperability and to assert IP rights in these interfaces. Some
firms are relatively open and nonproprietary toward their interfaces, often in hopes of generating network effects for their
systems. Other firms adopt business strategies that depend on
withholding interface information from those who want it and
using IP rights to block interoperability. Sometimes, firms’ incentives toward open or proprietary interfaces change over
time, as their business strategies evolve. Section B explains
why makers of early ICT systems tended to be nonproprietary
toward interfaces, why firms later came to rely on trade secrecy
and copyright law to protect interfaces, why efforts to assert
copyright protection in interfaces failed, and why this failure
contributed to a rise in the role of patents in protecting interfaces. Section C considers some advantages that patents have
over trade secrecy in protecting interfaces, particularly in controlling interoperability. Section D shows that interface patents
are sometimes used to challenge or thwart the development of
interoperable technologies.
A. SOME DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
As applied to ICT systems, interoperability means “[t]he
capability to communicate, execute programs, or transfer data
among various functional units in a manner that requires the
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user to have little or no knowledge of the unique characteristics
of those units.”7 A recent book points out:
Interoperability doesn’t require that two systems be identical in design or implementation, only that they can exchange information and
use the information they exchange. Interoperability requires that the
information being exchanged is conceptually equivalent; once this
equivalence is established, transforming different implementations to
a common exchange format is a necessary but often trivial thing to
do.8

Interoperability can occur when the maker of one ICT system develops interfaces that enable the exchange of information between the entity it is developing and the entities with
which its entity will interact, including importantly those developed by other firms.9 The modular structure of modern ICT
products, which interconnect through interfaces, has brought
about more and more rapid innovation than earlier monolithic
systems (e.g., mainframe computers of yesteryear) provided,
7. Int’l Electrotechnical Comm. [IEC], Information TechnologyVocabulary, at 6, ISO/IEC 2382-1 (3d ed. 1993). Although this Article will concentrate on interoperability in the computing and information industries, interoperability is also a very important concept in the telecommunications industry. To enable competition in telecom markets, it is necessary for incumbents
to provide resources for others to interconnect with their systems, which monopoly providers are sometimes reluctant to do. There is a long history of regulation of interconnection by both antitrust law and the Federal Communications Commission and similar agencies in other countries. See, e.g., Joseph
Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access
Policies: Toward a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet
Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 93–95 (2003) (discussing regulation of competition in telecommunications); see also 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) (2006) (discussing the
duties imposed on incumbent local exchange carriers).
8. ROBERT J. GLUSHKO & TIM MCGRATH, DOCUMENT ENGINEERING:
ANALYZING AND DESIGNING DOCUMENTS FOR BUSINESS INFORMATICS & WEB
SERVICES § 6.0 (2005).
9. ICT interfaces are informational equivalents of the standard plug and
socket designs that designers of electric appliances must use in order for their
appliances to successfully interoperate with the electrical grid for which they
are designed. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Strange Odyssey of Interfaces
in Intellectual Property Law (Berkeley Center for Law and Technology, Law
and Technology Scholarship, Paper No. 59, 2008), available at
http://repositories.cdlib.org/bclt/lts/59/ (using this analogy). Although all countries have adopted a standardized electrical socket and plug design, many
have adopted different socket and plug designs from one another. This is why
international business travelers have to bring transformers and multiple plug
kits with them when they travel. Spare parts for machinery raise similar issues to the interface issues discussed in this Article. See Jens Schovsbo, As If
Made for Each Other: Intellectual Property Rights and Protection of Compatible Products, 29 INT’L. REV. OF INDUS. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 510, 525–31
(1998) (providing an argument critical of design protection legislation insofar
as it impedes competition in product aftermarkets).
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leading to improved components (such as memory, disk drives,
and modems), mix and match experimentation to discover best
functionalities, and a proliferation of applications.10 Consumers
have benefitted by this innovation and also by the competition
among providers of these components, which has pushed prices
down and offered more choices than monolithic systems provided.11
Interoperability enables modern ICT systems to be very
powerful because they can call upon other systems’ functionalities.12 It is not necessary, for example, for each software developer to write code to perform common functions, such as accessing files or directories, because developers of operating systems
(OS) have incorporated these functionalities into their systems.13 A developer that wants others to build applications for
its product—which it often will in order to make the product attractive to customers—must make application programming interfaces (APIs) available to other firms.14 APIs disclose the
“hooks” (that is, standard formats for requests) that other developers must use to call upon the platform’s services to carry
out specific tasks for their applications.15 In this respect, APIs
are one-sided and outward-facing. That is, the developer of the
API doesn’t need to reveal to other developers the fine details
about how it provides the relevant service; it only needs to
supply the API which defines the manner in which to request
and successfully invoke the platform’s services.16
Programmers can generally design the internal structure
of programs to implement interfaces and encode those designs
in source code in many different ways.17 The interfaces do,
10. See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 7, at 92–93 (explaining briefly the
evolution of the computer industry, including the innovation of computer components).
11. See id. at 95–96 (discussing the benefits of modular systems, including
innovation and lower prices).
12. See David Orenstein, Application Programming Interface, COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 10, 2000, at 66 (explaining that “virtually all software has to
request other software to do some things for it,” which occurs through application programming interfaces).
13. Id.
14. See id. (“Corporate developers should consider including APIs in applications they develop, especially if they expect the applications to last and
interact with other applications.”).
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. In rare instances, functionalities may be defined to be “bit exact,” that
is, the interface must be encoded exactly in the same manner for the imple-
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however, constrain program design to some degree because of
the need to precisely conform a request for a program’s services
to the interface specification for those services.18
While APIs typically specify how applications should exchange information with the platform on which it is built, protocols are components of interfaces that often facilitate communications (i.e., interoperability) across different computers
or ICT systems.19 Protocols define rules for information exchanges by specifying, for example, how to start and end messages, how to format messages, what to do with corrupted or
improperly formatted messages, and the like.20 ICT systems
typically involve multiple layers of functional units that interact with one another through a set of defined protocols.21 File
format specifications, including compression algorithms and
digital rights management architectures, are also interfaces
that affect interoperability among data files and programs and
devices utilizing those files.
Another important distinction is that between interfaces
and standards. Sometimes interfaces are collaboratively developed by technologists with the intent to promulgate them as
standards (e.g., the Hypertext Transfer Protocol a/k/a HTTP).
Other interface designs initially developed by private parties
(e.g., the Portable Document Format a/k/a PDF) are later formentation to be interoperable. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977
F.2d 1510, 1515–16 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that exact copying of certain
code segments is necessary to achieve interoperability).
18. See, e.g., JONATHAN BAND & MASANOBU KATOH, INTERFACES ON TRIAL
8 (1995) (explaining that new applications have to conform to all the interface
specifications of an existing operating system used by the application and the
computer).
19. See GLUSHKO & MCGRATH, supra note 8, § 9.5 (discussing protocols in
the business process context). For a protocol to work across two computers, the
code to implement it needs to be on both computers. With APIs, the code to
implement the service only needs to be on one computer.
20. See id.
21. An important principle for modern communications systems is that
“the entity responsible for a given protocol should respond only to events and
messages from its counterpart in the same layer at the other end of the communication.” Id. An e-mail server, for instance, can and should signal receipt
of a message from another e-mail server, but not from other applications in
different layers of the stack. Id. A good implementation of a protocol should be
“robust,” that is, it should be conservative in what it sends and liberal in what
it receives. See, e.g., INFO. SCIENCES INST., DOD STANDARD INTERNET PROTOCOL 21 (1980), http://www.faqs.org/ftp/rfc/pdf/rfc760.txt.pdf (“That is, it should
be careful to send well-formed datagrams, but should accept any datagram
that it can interpret (e.g., not object to technical errors where the meaning is
still clear).”).
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mally adopted as standards. Privately developed interface designs can also become de facto standards when the platforms
for which they were designed become successful in the marketplace. Some interfaces and interface techniques, however, never become standards.
Although it is useful to conceptualize ICT interoperability
at a general level, it is important to realize that interoperability has somewhat different meanings in different ICT contexts.22
In the context of computer programs, for example, it means
that programs can function effectively with other software
and/or hardware to carry out the tasks they were designed to
perform.23 In the context of digital identification (ID) systems,
interoperability means the ability of two or more systems to
understand ID information and metadata about users so that
user data can be successfully transferred and exchanged among
services using the ID system.24 In the context of technically
protected digital music, interoperability means that two or
more players are either using the same technical protection
measures or each can convert its encoding of the work into the
encoding scheme of the other system so that music can be
played on many devices and/or made available in a variety of
online channels.25 In the context of electronic commerce, interoperability means an exchange of messages (e.g. an order and
an acceptance of an order) that will result in a successful business transaction.26 Although this Article will mainly focus on
22. See, e.g., GASSER & PALFREY, supra note 1, at 4 –5 (explaining that the
definition of interoperability depends on the views of the stakeholder).
23. See Software Directive, supra note 5, at 43 (“The function of a computer program is to communicate and work together with other components of a
computer system and with users and, for this purpose, a logical and, where
appropriate, physical interconnection and interaction is required to permit all
elements of software and hardware to work with other software and hardware
and with users in all the ways in which they are intended to function.”). This
functional interconnection and interaction is what the Directive characterizes
as interoperability. Id.
24. GASSER & PALFREY, supra note 1, at 5; see also JOHN PALFREY & URS
GASSER, CASE STUDY: DIGITAL IDENTITY INTEROPERABILITY AND EINNOVATION
10–11 (2007), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/interop/pdfs/interop-digital-id.pdf
(providing a definition for ID information interoperability).
25. See GASSER & PALFREY, supra note 1, at 5–6 (using a case study to
provide an example of DRM interoperability); see also URS GASSER & JOHN
PALFREY, CASE STUDY: DRM-PROTECTED MUSIC INTEROPERABILITY AND EINNOVATION 4 –7 (2007), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/interop/pdfs/interop-drmmusic.pdf (providing a definition for DRM interoperability).
26. See GLUSHKO & MCGRATH, supra note 8, § 9.6.1. It is also important
to distinguish between the technical capability for interoperability and actual
implementations of this technical capability, which are likely to depend on
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computer program interfaces, many of the same legal and policy issues, as well as technical, economic, and business issues
affecting interoperability, cut across ICT systems.
Many stakeholders have interests in interoperability.27 Developers of platforms have a very big stake in interoperability
because they generally benefit from the development of applications that work on their platforms.28 This is largely because of
the positive feedback loop created by network effects, as customers are drawn to the platform as more applications are
available for the platform, and more applications developers
are drawn to the platform as the platform attracts more customers.29 Developers of complementary products benefit by interoperability because they can create products that work on
platforms with large customer bases, and complements typically add value to the network.30 Consumers benefit from interoperability insofar as they can use the same information resources on multiple platforms in a “plug and play” fashion.31
Many intermediaries, such as vendors of ICT products, benefit
when interoperability exists among products in the marketplace, as it is easier to sell compatible components. The very
success of a platform may cause other developers to try to develop a platform compatible with the successful platform, arguing that consumers will benefit by having more than one
source and stressing the importance of a level playing field on
which competition can occur based on price, quality, and differbusiness agreements among the relevant firms. There are also important power dimensions to interoperability. Walmart, for instance, may demand that
any firms that want to do business with it conform their business documents
to the electronic data interface specifications that it has set forth. Other firms
may be more willing to build interfaces and services that meet their suppliers’
needs.
27. Id.
28. Cf. id. (discussing the views of stakeholders, including platform providers).
29. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell, Standardization and Intellectual Property, 30
JURIMETRICS J. 35, 36 (1989); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 488–95 (1998).
30. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual
Property Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 561 (2003) (explaining the benefits
America Online receives by allowing complementary products to operate on its
platform).
31. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & David W. O’Brien, Encouraging Software
Reuse, 49 STAN. L. REV. 255, 289 (1997). The deployment of noninteroperable
systems also puts consumer investments at risk, as it may be difficult to predict which technology is likely to become the de facto standard. The market for
high definition DVDs, for example, did not develop rapidly because of the noninteroperability of the Blu-Ray and HD-DVD formats.
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ences in feature sets.32 The market may become larger for all
players when there is one interface and many implementations,
rather than multiple platforms, each of which is noninteroperable with the other. The interests of successful platform developers and emerging competitors are, however, not always
aligned.33
Interoperability is often conceived as a binary concept: one
ICT entity either interoperates with another ICT entity or it
doesn’t.34 From the users’ standpoint, there is certainly something to this. But interoperability can also be conceived as a
continuum or spectrum, along which some entities (e.g., programs or content) are more interoperable than others. (Market
forces often require firms to be near the fully interoperable end
of the continuum; in most cases, products that are only 90 percent interoperable will find it difficult to compete against those
that are more fully interoperable.) At one end of the spectrum
are entirely closed systems that reveal no APIs. At the other
end of the spectrum are systems that expose all details of its
design, such as open source software.
Microsoft is somewhere in the middle of this spectrum. It is
closer to the open end of this spectrum insofar as it publishes
many of its APIs and licenses others. These APIs are generally
sufficient to allow independent software vendors (ISVs) to write
programs that will operate on Windows-based platforms.35 Microsoft does not, however, disclose all of the interface information that ISVs might want to know. Often the undisclosed information pertains to how one part of its system calls upon the
services of another component.36 ISVs may want greater access
to information about these system calls to achieve better per32. See, e.g., BAND & KATOH, supra note 18, at 330–34
33. Id.
34. See GASSER & PALFREY, supra note 1, at 4 (providing a definition of
interoperability).
35. See MSDN Library, http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/default
.aspx (last visited Apr. 29, 2009) (containing many of Microsoft’s APIs).
36. Although Microsoft may justify nondisclosure on the grounds that it
did not consider such information to be part of the APIs that ISVs need to
know, critics of Microsoft have sometimes charged it with hiding interface information in order to gain strategic advantages (e.g., faster implementations of
certain key functions) over firms whose products compete with Microsoft’s.
See, e.g., Microsoft’s Allegedly Undocumented APIs—Comes v. Microsoft,
http://www.groklaw.net/articlebasic.php?story=2007020819534335 (Apr. 29,
2007) (providing the expert’s supplemental report in Comes v. Microsoft explaining Microsoft’s use of undisclosed information to gain advantages over
other firms).
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formance or build a richer feature set for their programs.37 Frustrated about Microsoft’s limited disclosure of internal APIs,
some have engaged in reverse engineering to discern and document unlicensed interface information.38
Microsoft is far from the only firm that has adopted a business strategy that depends on controlling access to interface information and interoperability. Firms may adopt a controlled
interoperability strategy because it may be more lucrative than
a completely open, fully interoperable strategy. Consumers are
presumably willing to pay a premium for value they perceive
they are getting from at least some noninteroperable products.
When Apple launched its iTunes service for selling digital music to customers of its iPod technology, for example, it hoped to
establish its own network and network effects without direct
competition from other music platform providers.39 Apple’s considerable success with this strategy gave RealNetworks incentives to reverse engineer Apple’s FairPlay technology so that it
could make its RealPlayer compatible with iTunes music.40 Although Apple’s initial response was to threaten to sue RealNetworks for violating certain IP rules, it soon adopted a more
effective response by changing the iTunes interface to disable
the RealPlayer’s compatibility feature.41 To compete effectively
against Apple, RealNetworks has incentives to develop technology and music services that would be more attractive to consumers.42 Competition among proprietary systems, as well as
among open systems, can promote social welfare.43
Microsoft and Apple are among the many firms that rely on
IP rights as one means by which to control interoperability and
37. Whether undocumented details are “essential” to achieving interoperability can be a matter of some debate. See, e.g., Nokia Corp. v. Interdigital
Tech. Corp., [2007] EWHC (Pat) 445, [1]-[35] (Eng.) (addressing dispute between the parties as to the “essentiality” of certain patents to compliance with
standards adopted by the European Technical Standards Institute for mobile
telephones).
38. Numerous books have disclosed such APIs. See, e.g., SVEN SCHREIBER,
UNDOCUMENTED WINDOWS 2000 SECRETS (2001). While some programmers
believe that more API information is always better, there are some costs associated with extensive APIs. The more extensive they are, the more difficult it
may be to learn and make good use of them.
39. GASSER & PALFREY, supra note 1, at 6.
40. See id. at 9.
41. Cf. id. (expressing “objections” over the reverse engineering).
42. See id. at 9–10.
43. Cf. Weiser, supra note 30, at 536–40 (discussing the benefits of open
systems and competitive platform models on society).
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to stop unlicensed persons from offering compatible technologies. Because IP rights have played a complex and dynamic role
in regulating interoperability, Section B will explain how IP
law evolved as to interfaces and why patents were slow in becoming an important form of protection for interfaces.
B. EVOLVING IP RULES AND PRACTICES AS TO INTERFACES
In the early years of the industry, computers were standalone devices that were typically physically connected to only a
few terminals and output devices. Anyone who wanted to
process the same data or programs on different machines had
to hand-carry the punch cards or magnetic tape on which the
information was stored from one machine to the next. After the
development of computers capable of storing and executing
programs and processing data, it became evident that customers valued having compatible systems. To aid customers in
achieving compatibility, many firms, including IBM, often distributed source code and interface specifications without IP restrictions.44 Firms had incentives to make source code and/or
interface specifications available and allow unrestricted use of
them so that customers could, for instance, customize the technologies to meet their needs and so that other firms could make
complementary products that would work on the hardware or
with the software installed on that hardware. Even before the
term “network effects” was coined to describe the phenomenon,
it was obvious that a firm could create demand for its platform
by aiding others to develop information resources for it.45
44. See, e.g., BAND & KATOH, supra note 18, at 19; see also Anita Stork,
Note, The Use of Arbitration in Copyright Disputes: IBM v. Fujitsu, 3 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 241, 242–43 (1987) (pointing out that IBM distributed source code
without copyright restrictions through the 1970s).
45. The open-publication strategy of that era was also possibly affected by
uncertainties that then existed about whether computer programs, let alone
interfaces, qualified for either copyright or patent protection. Although the
Copyright Office began accepting registrations of computer programs in 1965,
it did so under its “rule of doubt” (meaning that there is an express understanding that doubt exists as to whether the code qualifies for copyright protection should litigation later occur). Indeed, the registration certificates indicated the Office’s doubt about the copyrightability of programs in machineexecutable form. See, e.g., COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 31D (Jan. 1965), reprinted in Duncan M. Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 611, 652 n.72. See generally Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer
Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663 (explaining that
the Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works (CONTU) failed to consider the primary aims of copyright
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Starting in the mid- to late-1970s, manufacturers of computer systems came to realize that interfaces were commercially valuable, and it became more common for firms to withhold
source code or interface information from those who wanted
access to them.46 Firms began to think of source code and interface specifications as trade secrets and to distribute programs
in object code form.47 They claimed copyright protection for that
code and often hoped copyright would also protect them against
reverse engineering (which inevitably requires making intermediate copies of the code), thus indirectly preventing trade secrets in interfaces from being discerned and thwarting the efforts of unlicensed parties to make interoperable systems.48
In the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, some firms, IBM prominently among them, also argued copyright protection should be
available for original interfaces embodied in programs.49 The
issue first arose in litigation when the manufacturer of an Apple clone computer claimed that it was necessary to copy the
Apple OS so that their work-alike computers could achieve interoperability with programs written for the Apple platform.50
and patent law when recommending that current intellectual property law
protect machine readable computer programs). Doubts about the patentability
of programs arose because programs are texts and because many information
innovations embedded in programs, such as algorithms, are “mental
processes” (that is, processes that can be carried out in the human mind or
with the aid of a pen and paper). See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,
71–72 (1972) (denying patentability of an algorithm for transforming binary
coded decimals to pure binary form). See generally Pamela Samuelson, Benson
Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025 (1990) [hereinafter
Samuelson, Benson Revisited] (discussing case law and doctrinal developments related to the patentability of program algorithms and program-related
inventions).
46. See, e.g., Farrell & Weiser, supra note 7, at 92 (“To keep its system
closed, IBM kept the interfaces between the different parts of its system secret
and proprietary.”).
47. Allen R. Grogan, Decompilation and Disassembly: Undoing Software
Protection, COMPUTER LAW., Feb. 1984, at 1.
48. See id. (discussing the core argument for this approach).
49. Trademark and false advertising law is sometimes used to challenge
those who develop compatible ICT systems. See, e.g., Creative Labs, Inc. v. Cyrix Corp., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1872, 1876 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (granting a preliminary
injunction against the sale of sound cards that were not “fully compatible”
with the plaintiffs’ system, as the defendant’s ads claimed).
50. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,
1245 (3d Cir. 1983). Franklin also argued that Congress had only intended to
protect application programs that interacted with people, not purely functional
programs such as operating systems. See id. at 1246–52. The court did not find
this or other Franklin defenses persuasive. See id. at 1251. This challenge was
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The court responded:
Franklin may wish to achieve total compatibility with independently
developed application programs written for the Apple II, but that is a
commercial and competitive objective which does not enter into the
somewhat metaphysical issue of whether particular ideas and expressions have merged.51

This dicta dimmed the prospects for success of future compatibility defenses to copyright claims.
Further dimming these prospects was the Third Circuit’s
decision in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.52 Whelan characterized computer programs as “literary
works” and reasoned that since copyright law had long protected nonliteral elements (i.e., structure and organization) of
literary works, such as novels and plays, it should protect the
structure, sequence, and organization (SSO) of programs as
well.53 Whelan deemed all program SSO to be protectable by
copyright law as long as there was more than one way to structure a program to achieve the program’s functions.54 Without
broad copyright protection for computer programs, and in particular, for aspects of program SSO that were costly and difficult to develop as well as commercially significant, the Whelan
court worried that there would be too little protection to provide proper incentives to develop computer programs.55
Because interfaces are unquestionably part of program
SSO, Whelan seemed to extend copyright protection to them.
When Computer Associates (CA) sued Altai for copying of CA’s
interfaces,56 it relied heavily on Whelan.57 CA pointed to subsomewhat surprising, given that Congress had amended copyright law to clarify that programs could be copyrighted. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (2006)).
51. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1253.
52. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986). For a detailed explanation of the flaws in
the Whelan analysis of the scope of copyright in computer programs, see Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes From
the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1962–73 (2007).
53. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1233–40, 1248.
54. Id. at 1236. If there was just one way to structure a program to perform particular functions, though, the “idea” of that function and its structural
“expression” would be “merged” and treated as among the unprotectable program “ideas.” Id. at 1228, 1247.
55. Id. at 1237.
56. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y.
1991), aff ’d in part, vacated in part, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
57. See Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant passim, Computer Assocs. Int’l,
Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (No. 91-7893) (relying heavily on
Whelan).
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stantial similarities between the compatibility components of
Altai’s Oscar program and its CA-Scheduler program, especially as to their parameter lists (i.e., lists of information that must
be sent or received by subroutines to invoke specific scheduling
tasks).58 CA argued the parameter lists had been carefully and
precisely designed, making them costly to develop and commercially significant parts of its programs.59 CA argued that incentives to invest in software development would be undermined if
competitors such as Altai could appropriate program SSO without fear of liability.60
Altai was able to persuade the court to recognize that external factors sometimes constrain program design choices.61
Because CA-Scheduler and Oscar provided the same scheduling
services and both were designed to interoperate with the same
IBM OS programs, similarities in their parameter lists were
understandable and not evidence of infringement.62 The court
in Altai asserted that extending copyright protection to program interfaces would “have a corrosive effect on certain fundamental tenets of copyright doctrine”63 and suggesting patents
as an alternative form of IP protection for interfaces.64
The Altai decision may not initially have caused software
developers and their lawyers to think seriously about patenting
interfaces and other program SSO, in part because it took some
years for Altai to defeat Whelan in the subsequent caselaw and
58. Id. at 5–6.
59. See id. at 3.
60. See id. at 14 (discussing some of the goals in seeking copyright protection).
61. See BAND & KATOH, supra note 18, at 9. The court in Altai relied on
the Nimmer treatise which had taken the position that interfaces were aspects
of programs for which no copyright protection should be available because of
the constraints they placed on design choices of subsequent programmers. See
Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 709–10 (2d Cir. 1992)
(citing 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
13.01, at 13-4 (1991)).
62. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 12–14, Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc.
v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (No.91-7893).
63. Altai, 982 F.2d at 712. The court criticized Whelan for its unduly
broad conception of the scope of copyright in computer programs, for its reliance on metaphysical distinctions rather than practical considerations, and
for its outdated comprehension of computer science. Id. at 705–06. Protecting
interfaces would be corrosive of copyright principles because they are too functional to be protected as original expression of an author. See, e.g., Samuelson,
Benson Revisited, supra note 45, at 1146 n.472 (explaining that copyright and
patent law should be “separate and exclusive”); infra Parts II–III.
64. Altai, 982 F.2d at 712.
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emerge as the leading decision about software copyrights.65
However, the patent option became more attractive after the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade,
Inc.66
Sega was important in the IP-in-interfaces saga for at least
four reasons. For one thing, it embraced Altai’s rhetorical approach to conceptualizing computer programs as utilitarian
works eligible for only a thin scope of copyright protection.67
Second, Sega followed Altai in ruling that program interfaces
were elements of programs that copyright law did not protect;
indeed, Sega spoke of interface information as “functional requirements for achieving compatibility with other programs.”68
Third, the court ruled that copying program code in the course
of reverse engineering for a legitimate purpose such as extracting interface information to make a compatible program did not
infringe copyright.69 The court recognized that
If disassembly of copyrighted object code is per se an unfair
use, the owner of the copyright gains a de facto monopoly over
the functional aspects of his work—aspects that were expressly
denied copyright protection by Congress. In order to enjoy a
lawful monopoly over the idea or functional principle underlying a work, the creator of the work must satisfy the more stringent standards imposed by the patent laws.70
Fourth, it indicated that even copying some exact code
from another program would not be infringement insofar as
that code was essential to achieving interoperability.71

65. Altai has been followed in at least forty-nine subsequent decisions.
See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 814–15 (1st Cir.
1995). Lotus relied heavily on Whelan in support of its claim that Borland infringed its copyright in the command hierarchy of the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface. The First Circuit ruled that the command hierarchy was an unprotectable method of operating a spreadsheet program under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Id.
at 815. Although the Supreme Court took Lotus’s appeal from the First Circuit’s ruling, the Court was evenly divided 4 -4 on the merits, and hence affirmed the lower court’s ruling. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 516
U.S. 233, 233 (1996) (per curiam). By 1996, however, Altai had become the
standard software copyright-infringement case, displacing Whelan.
66. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
67. See id. at 1526 (“Under the Copyright Act, if a work is largely functional, it receives only weak protection.”).
68. Id. at 1525–26.
69. Id. at 1527–28 (finding reverse engineering copies to be fair use).
70. Id. at 1526.
71. See id. at 1516, 1528–32 (treating certain Sega code as too functional
for copyright protection).
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After Sega, developers could no longer hope to protect interfaces by copyright. Because Sega endorsed unlicensed copying of code to extract interface information,72 it imperiled developer efforts to protect interfaces as trade secrets.73 Sega sigsignaled that the only reliable means for protecting the functional requirements for achieving interoperability was by patenting them. Patents have a key advantage over copyrights in
protecting interfaces because patent law has no “merger” doctrine.74 Hence, if there is only one way to achieve a particular
function and a developer has patented that one way, it can enforce its patent to stop unlicensed uses.75 Moreover, patent law
also has no explicit reverse engineering privilege.76
Altai and Sega contributed to the eventual shift away from
claims of copyright in program interfaces and toward reliance
on patent protection. Patent protection also became more
plausible and attractive as the courts became more receptive to
software patents.77 The Supreme Court had initially cast doubt
72. Prior to Sega, some commentators had argued that reverse engineering of object code should be treated as both copyright infringement and tradesecret misappropriation. See e.g., Grogan, supra note 53, at 4 –5. Some commentators argue that reverse engineering should be treated as copyright infringement because of the intermediate copying required to reverse engineer
and as trade-secret misappropriation because the infringing copies made in
reverse engineering constituted an improper means to get the trade secrets
embodied in the object code. Id.
73. See Victoria A. Cundiff, Trade Secrets and the Internet: Preventing the
Internet from Being an Instrument of Destruction, in 12TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 403, 413 (PLI Intellectual Prop. Course
Handbook Series No. G-877, 2006), WL 877 PLI/PAT. 403.
74. Cf. Oskar Liivak, The Forgotten Originality Requirement: A Constitutional Hurdle for Gene Patents, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 261, 29697 (2005) (advocating for an adoption of the merger doctrine for patents).
75. Patent law has, however, a number of policy options that can be employed to limit the scope of patents. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley,
Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 passim (2003).
76. But see generally Julie E. Cohen et al., Patent Scope and Innovation in
the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2001) (exploring patent doctrines
that might permit reverse engineering of software even if some components of
the software were patented).
77. The European experience with software patents and special concerns
about interface patents are discussed below in Part II.A. A concise history of
European perspectives on software patents can be found in a study commissioned by the European Parliament about the patentability of computer programs. See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament
and of the Council on the Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions,
at 2–6, COM (2002) 92 final (Feb. 20, 2002), available at http://www2.europarl
.eu.int/oeil/file.jsp?id=219592 [hereinafter Proposed Software Patent Directive].
See generally REINIER BAKELS & P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, THE PATENTABILITY
OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS: DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN-LEVEL LEGISLATION IN
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on the patentability of program innovations in the 1970s,78 but
the Court was receptive to one such patent in its 5-4 decision in
1981 in Diamond v. Diehr.79 Relying on some broad language in
Diehr,80 the Federal Circuit during the 1980s and 1990s developed a capacious conception of patentable subject matter under
which virtually all computer program-related inventions are
patentable.81 This, coupled with increasing “thinness” of copyright protection after Altai and Sega achieved widespread acceptance in the mid-1990s, led to a big surge in the patenting of
software innovations,82 including the issuance of patents on interfaces.
Although program interfaces can generally be patented in
the United States,83 firms do not always choose to seek patents
THE FIELD OF PATENTS FOR SOFTWARE (2002) (discussing European-level legislation in the field of patents for software), available at http://www.ivir.nl/
publications/other/softwarepatent.html.
78. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 584 (1978); Gottshalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 71–73 (1972).
79. 450 U.S. 175, 175–76 (1981). Diehr claimed a new method of curing
rubber that used a computer program to calculate when the temperature of
the rubber inside molds had reached the proper curing point. Id. at 177. The
PTO rejected Diehr’s claim because its only novelty lay in the program’s calculations. Id. at 179–81. The Diehr decision was initially perceived as a modest
change in the patent landscape as to program-related inventions. Because the
Court was so deeply divided, the majority opinion did not repudiate the
Court’s earlier rulings on the unpatentability of certain program innovations,
and Diehr involved a traditional manufacturing process (i.e., curing rubber).
Id.
80. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182 (stating that patentable subject matter includes
everything “under the sun made by man”) (citations omitted).
81. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1353
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that the claimed subject matter was patentable).
82. See Josh Lerner et al., What is the Impact of Software Patent Shifts?:
Evidence from Lotus v. Borland 10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 11168, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11168 (noting that there is empirical evidence of a surge in the patenting of software dating from the mid-1990s).
83. Software industry representatives with whom I spoke estimate that
there are many thousands of patents on interfaces. Lexis searches for patents
using search terms such as “application program interfaces” and “communications protocols” yield thousands of “hits” (Lexis search in the MEGA database
on March 5, 2009 confirms this result). Patent lawyers believe there are likely
many more interface patents than these searches reveal because patent applications often do not mention the term “interface” or “communications protocol.” Interfaces are sometimes claimed as a component of a feature they enable. See Scott Elengold, Note, An Inquiry Into Computer System Patents:
Breaking Down the “Software Engineer”, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 349, 360
(2005). Most interface patents do not cover the totality of the interface, but
small parts of interfaces. Id.
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for interface designs.84 Not patenting interfaces makes sense
for developers whose business strategy relies upon publication
of interfaces as a potential generator of network effects, as well
as for collaboratively developed interfaces, such as those for
open source projects.
Even firms with more proprietary approaches toward interfaces may still have good reasons not to patent them. For one
thing, program interfaces can often be protected quite effectively as trade secrets.85 Because commercially distributed programs are typically shipped in machine-executable form, program interfaces are not readily discernible when running the
program through its various tasks. Trade secrecy is a much
cheaper and easier means of getting IP protection for an interface than seeking a patent;86 it also obviates the need for disclosure of any innovation the interface embodies.87
Trade secrecy can, of course, be jeopardized by reverse engineering conducted by those who want to access interface information, but firms can and often do try to counteract this risk
by inserting antireverse engineering clauses into their license
agreements,88 or by obfuscating the design to make interfaces
difficult to discern. The more complex a program is, moreover,
the more difficult it will be to access interfaces through reverse
engineering.89 If unlicensed parties successfully reverse engineer a firm’s interface, the firm whose products have been reverse engineered can change the interface in subsequent versions, thereby thwarting interoperability by unlicensed firms.90
Still, some interfaces are patented, so it is worth considering
reasons why patenting interfaces sometimes may make sense.

84. See infra Part II.A for a discussion of possible rationales for excluding
interfaces from patent protection.
85. See Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1607–30 (2002).
86. See Douglas A. Barnes, Note, Deworming the Internet, 89 TEX. L. REV.
279, 292 (2004).
87. Trade secrecy also lessens the risk that the developer will be charged
with infringing someone else’s interface patent. See id.
88. This is a common practice in the software industry. See, e.g., Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 85, at 1626–30.
89. Cf. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 30, at 529 (“[R]everse engineering
an operating system’s program to achieve compatibility in a competing program is particularly difficult.”).
90. See id.
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C. INCENTIVES FOR PATENTING INTERFACES
Interfaces can be costly to develop and may embody significant innovations,91 which explains why firms sometimes want
to rely on patent incentives to recoup investments in these
technologies. But an even more powerful reason to patent interfaces may derive from the strong blocking power such patents
can confer over the development not only of competing but also
of complementary products insofar as the interface defines the
boundaries between ICT systems. 92
Interface patents are also valuable to their developers because it may be impossible to work around them.93 Even a very
narrowly drawn interface patent may preclude interoperability
as to key functions.94 Detecting infringement of interface patents is generally easier than of other software patents because
if unlicensed products successfully interoperate with the patentee’s products, they likely infringe.95 The exclusionary power of
interface patents is, moreover, strong even if the technical design disclosed in the patent is only modestly innovative or an

91. See, e.g., William H. Page & Seldon J. Childers, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the European Microsoft Decision: The Microsoft-Samba Protocol License, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 332, 335, 354 (2008), available at http://
www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/16/
LRColl2008n16Page&Childers.pdf (characterizing Microsoft’s Active Directory
interfaces as innovative, distinctive, and costly).
92. See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1401, 1422 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (providing that the developer of a complementary product infringed an interface patent).
93. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty
Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2016 (2007) (discussing the holdup problem
arising from an inability to design around a patent on a component of a multicomponent technology).
94. See, e.g., BAKELS & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 77, at 21–22 (giving an
example of reverse engineering patents). Narrowly drawn interface patents
have an advantage over broadly written interface patents because narrow patents are generally easier to defend against invalidity challenges. See id.
95. Patents on internal designs of programs (e.g., algorithms) are, by contrast, often difficult to enforce offensively (i.e., to stop competitors from using
them) because such designs are typically difficult to discern from executing
commercially distributed object code. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & R.
Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 30–31 (2005). Although
firms often seek patents for internal design components, patents on such innovations are generally more useful for defensive than for offensive purposes.
See id. at 31–43. That is, developers tend to seek patents on such internal design elements to assure themselves of having the freedom to operate in developing software embodying these inventions as well as to build a portfolio of IP
assets so that the firms will have something to trade (e.g., by cross-licensing) if
a competitor asserts patent claims against them. See id.
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arbitrary variation on an existing technique.96 This means that,
absent contractual commitments or licensing obligations such
as those that may be imposed by standard setting organizations (SSOs),97 firms can usually charge higher royalty rates for
licensing interface patents than for licensing other patents, regardless of the degree of innovation the interface patents may
embody.98 For these reasons, interface patents are among the
most valuable patents that ICT developers can own.
Another incentive to patent interfaces may derive from a
perception that other forms of IP protection for interfaces are
weaker than patents. Insofar as outsiders can reverse engineer
ICT systems to gain access to interfaces, trade secrets in the interfaces may be vulnerable to appropriation.99 Determined reverse engineers may be motivated to discover obscure aspects of
interfaces.100 The enforceability of license restrictions on reverse engineering has, moreover, been widely questioned.101 Although copyright law protects program code, any interfaces
embedded in programs are beyond the scope of copyright’s protection.102 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Sega explicitly
suggested that patents may be the only effective way to protect
the functional requirements for achieving interoperability.103
Neither the PTO nor the courts seem to require much disclosure from developers of ICT interface techniques.104 Firms may
96. See, e.g., Maureen O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent
Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1218 (2000) (noting that many interfaces are
arbitrary, obvious, and of low intrinsic value).
97. See infra Part II.E.
98. See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 93, at 2009 (“[T]he patent
holder can demand almost five times as much money once the industry has
made irreversible investments.”); O’Rourke, supra note 96, at 1218 (“The creation of some interfaces may entail large costs and an interface may be valuable
compared to others in the market.”).
99. JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 5.02[1] (1998).
100. Id. § 4.04[4]; see also Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 85, at 1587
n.49–50.
101. Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 85, at 1626–30 (reviewing the
controversy over the enforceability of antireverse engineering clauses and why
most scholars think such clauses should not be enforced, particularly in massmarket licenses).
102. See infra notes 150–152 and accompanying text.
103. Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526 (9th Cir.
1992).
104. See, e.g., In re Hayes Microcomputer Prods., Inc., 982 F.2d 1527,
1532–39 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (rejecting challenges to an interface patent based on
the inadequacy of written description and best mode disclosure requirements
of patent law); see also Cohen et al., supra note 76, at 18 (“[T]he Federal Cir-
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thus be able to get patents on some aspects of their interfaces
while at the same time maintaining detailed specifications of
the interfaces as trade secrets.105
Established firms are more likely than entrepreneurs to
patent interfaces to gain control over the development of compatible systems. Entrepreneurs may sometimes seek patents on
interfaces to attract venture capital.106 Yet, patented interfaces
owned by entrepreneurial firms are unlikely to confer substantial market power because these firms will generally need to license such patents on reasonable terms to entice others to develop products or services for their platform.107
Incentives to seek patents for interfaces may, of course,
change over time. While a startup might be willing to disclose
cuit does not require would-be patentees of software inventions to disclose . . .
very much at all about their inventions.”).
105. Software developers cannot seek patent protection for documents detailing interface specifications, as such documents would be ineligible for patent protection as “printed matter.” See, e.g., In re Russell, 48 F.2d 668, 668–
69 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (holding a novel method of arranging surnames by phonetic
groupings to be unpatentable subject matter). Although copyright protection
might be available to an original comprehensive listing of interface details, the
scope of this copyright would be very thin, for implementation of the interface
in an independently developed program would not infringe copyright in the
listings under established caselaw. See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai,
Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703 (2d Cir. 1992); Sega, 977 F.2d at 1524.
106. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 973 (2007) (arguing that software patents
facilitate the financing of startup firms). Some venture capitalists, however,
regard software patents as a drag on innovation in the software industry. See
Abolish Software Patents, http://www.feld.com/wp/archives/2006/04/abolishsoftware-patents.html (Apr. 10, 2006).
107. U.S. Patent No. 6,125,391, issued in 2000 to Bart Meltzer et al., is an
example of an interface patent issued to entrepreneurs. See generally U.S. Patent No. 6,125,391 (filed Oct. 16, 1998). This patent covered key aspects of Internet business transaction exchanges and was an important asset for a small
start-up company, Veo Systems, Inc., that made Veo an attractive acquisition
target for Commerce One, which was building an e-commerce platform. Customers of Commerce One’s platform obtained a royalty-free perpetual license
to practice the invention; interface protocols and XML sample documents were
available under open licenses. See, e.g., John Markoff, Auction of Internet
Commerce Patents Draws Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2004, at C4. When
Commerce One went bankrupt, however, these patents were the most valuable
asset that Commerce One owned. See id. A bankruptcy auction brought in over
$15 million for them. See Lorie Long, Hanging on for Dear Life, BLUE RIDGE
BUS. J., Feb. 2005, available at http://www.bizjournal.com/content/article
.php?id=1. Although there was concern within the industry that these patents
had been obtained by a “patent troll,” it later came out that Novell purchased
them and dedicated them to a patent commons. See, e.g., John Markoff, Secretive Buyer of Some E-Commerce Patents Turns Out to Be Novell, N.Y. TIMES,
May 5, 2005, at C3.
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interfaces to attract customers and partners, when its ICT system becomes successful in the marketplace, the same firm may
become increasingly proprietary about its interfaces and more
inclined to seek patents for extensions of existing interfaces or
for new ones.108 Exerting proprietary control over interfaces is
also more likely as growth of the platform flattens, and its developer makes fewer investments in potentially disruptive innovations and more in maintaining control over the existing
market.
D. EXAMPLES OF INTERFACE PATENTS
One ICT interface patent that was exercised to block the
development of interoperable technologies was Nintendo’s patent for a relatively high-level design for a program-to-program
interface for its Nintendo Entertainment System (NES).109 The
NES included a game console, a monitor, and controls to allow
users to operate games played on the console.110 Nintendo developed games for its platform, but also licensed some other
firms to do the same.111 Loaded onto the NES console was an
initialization program called 10NES, which served as an authentication protocol so that only Nintendo’s games or those licensed by Nintendo could successfully be played on the NES
platform.112 Nintendo-authorized game cartridges contained a
program that interacted with the 10NES program and produced a data stream that, in essence, served as a key to open
the 10NES console lock so that games could be played.113
Through a combination of reverse and social engineering,114 Atari Games figured out how to generate a data stream
that would allow its games to run on the NES console. After
Atari Games began selling these games, Nintendo successfully
charged it with infringement of its patent on a system for determining authenticity of an external memory used in an in108. Patents on interfaces may amplify the network effects noted above.
See e.g., BAKELS & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 77, at 22.
109. See U.S. Patent No. 4,799,635 (filed Dec 23, 1985).
110. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1402, 1402 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
111. See id. at 1403.
112. See id. at 1402–03.
113. See id.
114. The social engineering occurred when an Atari Games lawyer obtained a copy of the 10NES source code by misrepresenting to the Copyright
Office the firm’s need for the program code for litigation purposes. See id. at
1402–03.
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formation processing apparatus.115 By patenting this authentication technique, Nintendo was able to exclude Atari Games
from making compatible products for its console and obtain
damages for the latter’s infringing uses.116
Sega Enterprises, a fierce competitor of Nintendo’s, licensed a patent on a Trade Mark Security System (TMSS) interface technique which it then embedded in its Genesis video
game system in a similar effort to prevent unlicensed videogame developers from producing games compatible with its
popular console.117 In Sega Enter., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., the
Ninth Circuit explained:
When a game cartridge is inserted, the microprocessor contained in
the Genesis III searches the game program for four bytes of data consisting of the letters “S-E-G-A” (the “TMSS initialization code”). If the
Genesis III finds the TMSS initialization code in the right location,
the game is rendered compatible and will operate on the console. In
such case, the TMSS initialization code then prompts a visual display
for approximately three seconds which reads “PRODUCED BY OR
UNDER LICENSE FROM SEGA ENTERPRISES LTD.”118

The Sega decision is mainly known for its ruling that Accolade made fair use of Sega’s copyrighted programs when it disassembled them to discern information necessary to make Genesis-compatible games.119 However, Sega also sued Accolade
for trademark infringement because the Sega trademark
popped up when Accolade’s games were played on the Genesis
console. Because TMSS was essential to achieving interopera115. See id. Atari Games sought a declaratory judgment of noninfringement as to both copyright and patent infringement claims in response to a
threat of litigation by Nintendo. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am.,
Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 835–37 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Nintendo counterclaimed for copyright and patent infringement, the former claim based in part on the intermediate copying of Nintendo code in the course of reverse engineering. Id. The
Federal Circuit upheld Atari’s fair-use defense as to reverse engineering done
for purposes of achieving compatibility with current versions of the 10NES
program, but not as to reverse engineering to achieve compatibility with those
parts of the 10NES program that might be used to thwart compatibility in the
future. See id. at 839–40. The lower court subsequently granted summary
judgment to Nintendo on patent claims. See Atari Games, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d at
1414.
116. The court concluded that Atari Games was a contributory infringer,
not a direct infringer, of this patent. See Atari Games, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1414;
see also Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of “Lock-Out” Programs, 68 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1091, 1101 (1995) (discussing both the patent and copyright claims in
Atari Games at length).
117. See U.S. Patent No. 4,462,076 (filed June 4, 1982).
118. 977 F.2d 1510, 1515 (9th Cir. 1992).
119. See id. at 1520–27.
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bility with the Sega platform, the Ninth Circuit ruled there was
no trademark infringement.120 Had Sega owned the patent on
TMSS, it would have been able to stop Accolade from making
games for its platform.
Patents on communications protocols have had powerful
exclusionary effects in other litigated cases involving widely
used ICTs. One was a patent on an improved method for controlling modes of modem operations that Hayes Microcomputer
used in its SmartModem products which became a de facto
standard in the modem market.121 Not only did software developers have to implement this protocol when developing software to interoperate with Hayes’ modems, but so did rival producers of modems. Modems are used to modulate and
demodulate signals, both analog and digital, that enable communications between telephones and computers. Modems have
two modes: a transparent mode in which the modem performs
its modulation-demodulation functions, and a command mode
in which modems respond to predetermined commands and
perform operations by executing instructions in firmware.122
Hayes arbitrarily designated as “+++_” as the predetermined
command that instructed the modem when to switch between
transparent and command modes. Ven-Tel was one of 125 modem manufacturers whose modems were compatible with this
feature of Hayes’ modems. Although Ven-Tel challenged the validity of this patent, a jury upheld it and found infringement.
The Federal Circuit then affirmed the verdict and issuance of
an injunction.123
Also successful was Verizon Services’ lawsuit against Vonage over a patented interface technique.124 Vonage began pro120. Id. at 1528–30. Sega was a licensee of the TMSS patent, not its owner,
so Sega did not bring a patent infringement suit against Accolade for the latter’s use of the TMSS. Id. at 1524 n.7.
121. U.S. Patent No. 4,549,302 (filed Oct. 11, 1983). The patent and some of
its claims are discussed in In re Hayes Microcomputer Prods, Inc., 982 F.2d
1527, 1531–32 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1530.
124. See generally Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d
1295 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Vonage was also sued by AT&T and Sprint Nextel for
infringing patents on methods and systems related to interconnecting traditional telephone calls with Internet-protocol networks. See Martyn Williams,
AT&T and Vonage End Patent Feud, PC WORLD, Dec. 23, 2007, http://www
.pcworld.com/article/140800/atandt_vonage_end_patent_feud.html. Qualcomm
and Nokia have just recently settled litigation over licensing terms for essential patents compliant with the standards of the European Telecommunica-

1968

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:1943

viding Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) telephone service to
customers in 2002; by the time Verizon sued it for patent infringement, Vonage had 2.2 million customers.125 Verizon’s patents covered methods of enhanced translation of telephone
numbers into and from Internet Protocol addresses, which facilitated more effective interconnection of VoIP services with telephone network services.126 A jury ruled against Vonage’s challenge to the patents’ validity and awarded Verizon $58 million
in damages.127 The trial judge stayed injunctive relief, pending
Vonage’s appeal.128 The Federal Circuit affirmed the finding of
infringement as to two of the patents,129 although remanding
the case for reassessment of damages;130 yet, it affirmed the issuance of an injunction.131 Within the Internet telephony community, concerns arose about the implications of Verizon’s patents for VoIP services more generally.132
Although Microsoft has not sued anyone for infringement
of its interface patents, it has sought and obtained a substantial number of patents on protocols for its computer programs
in recent years. It holds, for example, over sixty-five U.S. patents and more than ten European patents on work group serv-

tions Standards Institute (ETSI). See Tatum Anderson, Nokia-Qualcomm Settlement Boosts Sharing, Ends Costly Patent War, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
WATCH, July 31, 2008, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2008/07/31/nokiaqualcomm-settlement-boosts-sharing-ends-costly-patent-war/.
125. See Verizon, 503 F.3d at 1298.
126. See id. at 1299.
127. See id. at 1301–02.
128. See id. at 1301.
129. See id. at 1305.
130. See id. at 1310.
131. See id. at 1311. Vonage relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC in support of its argument that the public interest would be served by an award of damages in lieu of an injunction. Id. at
1310–11 (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)
(holding that courts have discretion not to issue injunctions in patent infringement cases)). The Federal Circuit was not persuaded. Id. at 1311. The
implications of the eBay case for interface patents are discussed in Part II.C.
Vonage was able to make an arrangement with a VoIP network services provider to carry calls placed by Vonage’s customers. See Eric Bangeman, Vonage
Hangs up on Verizon Patent Infringement with New Agreement, ARS TECHNICA, Apr. 2, 2007, http://www.arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news.ars/post/2007/
04/02-vonage-hangs-up-on-verizon-patent-infringement-with-new-agreement
.ars.
132. See Adario Strange, The Future of Internet Telephony Could Hang on
Vonage Case, WIRED, Apr. 26, 2007, http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/news/
2007/04/vonage_appeal.
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er and program protocols,133 and it has applied for numerous
patents for similar protocols.134 Microsoft relied on some of
these patents as a justification for refusing to provide and license interface information to Sun Microsystems and others in
a case brought by the European Commission charging it with
abuse of dominant position.135 Microsoft also owns an interface
patent on aspects of its Advanced Streaming Format (ASF).136
Some open source programmers wanted to write import/export
filters for ASF. Because doing so would infringe Microsoft’s patent, this follow-on software product has not been developed.137
These examples show that established firms with strong
market positions and/or market power sometimes seek and obtain patents on interfaces that increase their ability to control
the development of competing and complementary products.
The next section will consider various policy responses that
have been identified for dealing with the exclusionary power of
such patents.
II. POLICY OPTIONS FOR RESPONDING TO INTERFACE
PATENTS
In the past two decades, commentators and policy makers
have proposed a remarkably varied array of policy options to
deal with the exclusionary potency of patents on ICT interfaces.
Although owners of interface patents would likely assert that
they should be free to exercise their patent rights as they
wish,138 commentators, policymakers, and courts that analyzed

133. See MICROSOFT CORP., EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED STATES PATENTS AND PATENT APPLICATIONS FOR MICROSOFT WORK GROUP SERVER PROTOCOL PROGRAM PROTOCOLS (2008), available at http://download.microsoft

.com/download/2/8/a/28a250e5-5b79-4547-9959-346736ed
7a97/WSPP_Patent_Mapping.pdf [hereinafter MICROSOFT PATENT MAPPING].
134. See id.
135. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601; see
also infra Part II.D.
136. See, e.g., Posting of Andy Tai to Advogato, http://www.advogato.org/
article/101.html (June 5, 2000, 22:15 UTC) (“Microsoft patents the ASF media
file format.”).
137. Id. (“Microsoft . . . stops the author of VirtualDub, a GPLed video capture and processing program for Windows, from supporting ASF.”).
138. I have yet to find a single article or policy document that endorses the
view that owners of patents on interfaces should be able to exercise these patents free of any kind of regulatory scrutiny. The Federal Circuit’s decisions in
the Hayes and Verizon cases, discussed supra notes 121–131 and accompanying text, are, however, consistent with this position.
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the impacts of interface patents on interoperability have overwhelmingly favored some regulation of interface patents.
Section A reviews proposals to exclude interfaces from patent protection or to immunize the exercise of patents insofar
as this is essential for interoperability. Section B considers proposals to adapt or reform patent laws to facilitate interoperability. Section C discusses proposals to use liability rules rather
than property rules as to unauthorized uses of interface patents. Section D assesses the role of antitrust and competition
law in regulating refusals to license patents on ICT interfaces
and/or to supply information necessary to achieving interoperability. Section E sets forth several private sector initiatives
for dealing with patents on interfaces essential for interoperability.
A. BANNING PATENTS ON INTERFACES OR IMMUNIZING THEIR
USE
ICT interfaces may be so essential to achieving interoperability that some believe this justifies excluding interfaces from
the realm of patentable subject matter. Sun Microsystems, for
instance, has taken this position in some public policy debates.139 Some Sun executives believe that interfaces affecting
interoperability should be free from IP restrictions and be
treated as a commons upon which all comers should be free to
build.140 Alternatively, some have proposed abolishing software
patents altogether, which would obviously sweep away patents
on computer program interfaces.141
139. See BAND & KATOH, supra note 18, at 332–34.
140. Interview with Greg Papadopoulos, Chief Tech. Officer and Executive
Vice President of Research and Dev., Sun Microsystems, in San Jose, Cal.
(May 8, 2008). This theory builds on the work of Yochai Benkler and Jonathan
Zittrain who perceive the open and commons-like infrastructure of the Internet as having enabled innovation, competition, and other socially desirable results. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 106–07 (2006); JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 78–
79 (2008); see also Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure
and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 918–19 (2005). Some private initiatives aimed at muting the exclusionary power of interface patents,
discussed below in Part II.C, are consistent with the commons approach toward interfaces that is essential to interoperability.
141. A coalition of nonprofit organizations affiliated with the free- and
open- source software movements has formed to espouse the abolition of software patents. See generally End Software Patents, http://endsoftpatents.org
(last visited Apr. 29, 2009) (declaring that its goal is to “restore the software
market to a world run by innovators, not judges”). At least one venture capitalist agrees with the gist of this coalition’s arguments. See Abolish Software
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The European Commission’s recent interpretation of the
1991 directive on the legal protection of computer programs
may provide support for the abolish-interface-patents movement.142 In its proceeding against Microsoft for abuse of dominant position, based on that firm’s refusal to supply interface
information to Sun and others and to license its use, the Commission flatly denied that Microsoft owned any Intellectual
Property Rights (IPRs) in the interfaces the Commission ordered it to disclose to Sun and others.143 The interfaces, in the
Commission’s view, were “ideas and principles” under the
Software Directive.144
Although the EU Software Directive is often viewed as
having endorsed copyright as a means of legal protection for
computer programs,145 the Directive is better understood as
having created a sui generis (of its own kind) form of protection
for computer programs, especially as regards interfaces and interoperability, under the guise of copyright.146 The Software DiPatents, supra note 106. There are reasons to question the patentability of
software innovations as a matter of U.S. law. See generally Samuelson, Benson
Revisited, supra note 45 (discussing various arguments against patents on
computer program and other information innovations).
142. See Software Directive, supra note 5.
143. The Commission’s initial order against Microsoft indicated that the
Commission did not have enough information about Microsoft’s claimed IPRs
to make a judgment about the extent of these rights. Cf. Commission Decision,
supra note 6, ¶ 190 n.249 (“[S]ince the relevant specifications are not available
for scrutiny, it is not possible for the Commission to determine to what extent
Microsoft s claims relating to various intellectual property rights are justified.”). However, the Commission defended its order before the Court of First
Instance (CFI) by asserting that Microsoft had no IPRs in its interfaces. See
Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶¶ 276–78.
While it is possible that the Commission may only have been questioning the
validity of Microsoft’s interface patents, the CFI decision points to the Software Directive’s recitals, which refer to interfaces as ideas and principles. Id.
¶ 276. As I reflected on the Commission’s denial that Microsoft had IPRs in its
interfaces and the reference to the Directive’s recitals, I generated the sui generis interpretation of the Directive discussed in this Part.
144. Software Directive, supra note 5, at 43; see also BAND & KATOH, supra
note 18, at 83; W.R. Cornish, Inter-operable Systems and Copyright, 11 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 391, 391 (1989) (arguing that interface specifications are
unprotectable ideas or principles). But see Ashwin van Rooijen, Essential Interfaces: Exploring the Software Directive’s Equilibrium Between Intellectual
Property Rights and Competition Law, 5 COMPUTER L. REV. INT’L (CRi) 129,
136 (2007) (“[I]nterface specifications are not excluded from protection as
such.”).
145. See Software Directive, supra note 5, at 44.
146. I have previously argued in favor of a sui generis form of legal protection for programs. See Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the
Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 passim
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rective gives computer programs an unusually “thick” scope of
protection as to the underlying structure of programs.147 However, the Directive defines interfaces necessary for interoperability as unprotectable ideas and principles,148 even though
they may be very important and commercially significant elements of program structure.
The sui generis decompilation provisions of the Directive
reinforce the thick protection for most internal program structure because it is illegal under the Directive to decompile a
program unless the decompiler is trying to get access to interface information.149 In essence, the Council made copyright law
into a super-strong trade secrecy law as to every aspect of program internals—except interfaces.
Under the Directive, published interfaces, as ideas and
principles, are in the public domain and available for free copying. Embedded in program code, interfaces remain unprotected
ideas and principles, although they can be hidden away if the
program’s developer distributes its code in machine-executable
form, as is common in the software industry.150 The Directive
(1994). Within the framework set forth in the Manifesto, program interfaces
would be industrial compilations of applied know-how eligible for a short period of exclusivity, following which others could use the interfaces, subject to
an obligation to compensate the interface’s developer. See id. at 2326–30,
2370. Treating interfaces as unprotectable ideas or principles avoids a problem
that the Manifesto did not address, namely, the likelihood that firms would
revise their interfaces to ensure continued exclusivity and thereby thwart
compatibility with unlicensed parties’ products.
147. See generally BRIDGET CZARNOTA & ROBERT J. HART, LEGAL PROTECTION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS IN EUROPE—A GUIDE TO THE EC DIRECTIVE
(1991). For a comparison of U.S. and EU law in respect of protection of internal structure of computer programs, see Pamela Samuelson, Comparing U.S.
and EC Copyright Protection for Computer Programs: Are They More Different
than They Seem?, 13 J.L. & COM. 279, 292–97 (1994).
148. See Software Directive, supra note 5, at 43–44.
149. See id. at 45; van Rooijen, supra note 144, at 130–32 (discussing the
balancing mechanisms embedded in the sui generis provisions of the Directive). The Directive’s highly restrictive rules about decompilation are in stark
contrast to the U.S. fair-use balancing approach. See Samuelson, supra note
147, at 285–92.
150. In addition to denying that Microsoft had any patents in its WGS-OS
interfaces, the European Commission rejected Microsoft’s claim that it had
protectable trade secret interests in the detailed interface information it
wished to withhold from Sun and other competitors. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 276. The logic of the Commission’s position flows from the Directive having deemed interface information to
be unprotectable ideas and principles, its having authorized reverse engineering to get access to these ideas and principles, and its giving very strong IP
protection to other program internals other than interfaces, such that the
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contemplates that those who want to develop interoperable
programs can gain lawful access to these secrets in one of two
ways: either by licensing the interface information from the
software’s developer or by reverse engineering the code to extract interface information. The latter option is, however, only
available under the Directive if the information is not readily
available on reasonable terms from the program’s developer.151
This suggests that the Directive’s intent is not to encourage reverse engineering activities, but rather to induce firms to license interface information on reasonable terms because if they
don’t, would-be interoperators will be able to lawfully reverse
engineer the code to extract the information.152
Another sui generis provision of the Directive protects interfaces from a market-destructive loss of secrecy by limiting
what lawful reverse engineers can do with information about
interfaces that they extract. Engineers are authorized to use
the information to develop an independently developed program that interoperates with the reverse-engineered program,
but they are forbidden from disclosing the reverse-engineered
interface information to others.153 Each firm that wants to develop an interoperable program must thus undertake the same
tedious reverse engineering process to get access to interface
information if it is unable to license the information from the
first program’s developer. To ensure that the inducement to licensing is not thwarted, the Directive also provides that the decompilation privilege cannot be contracted away.154
If, as this Article suggests, the Software Directive created a
sui generis rule against IP protection for interfaces in the EU,
it would follow that patent protection should not be available
for interfaces either.155 European patent law, like U.S. patent
law, does not allow ideas or principles to be patented.156 ChaCommission thought trade secrecy would not be necessary for program details.
151. See Software Directive, supra note 5, at 45. The Software Directive
makes clear that it is not lawful to reverse engineer any parts of the program
other than those that contain interface information. Cf. id.
152. Induced licensing has the advantage of getting some compensation to
the developer of the interface, while at the same time ensuring that second
comers have the information they need to make their systems interoperable.
153. See Software Directive, supra note 5, at 45.
154. Id.
155. The European Patent Office does not, however, interpret the Software
Directive as precluding patents on program interfaces, for it has issued some
patents on interface designs to Microsoft. See MICROSOFT PATENT MAPPING,
supra note 133.
156. See BAKELS & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 77, at 28.
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racterizing interfaces necessary to interoperability as ideas and
principles would logically mean that the interfaces should be
regarded as unpatentable under the Directive.157 The Commission may have had this interpretation in mind when it denied
that Microsoft owned patents on its interfaces.158
The Court of First Instance (CFI) decided it was unnecessary to resolve whether Microsoft had any IP rights in its interfaces, although it assumed for the sake of the appeal that Microsoft did have some IPRs in its interfaces.159 The issue of
whether the Software Directive excludes interfaces from patent
protection has thus been left for another day.
Program interfaces are far more likely to be regarded as
patentable subject matter under U.S. law. Many interface patents have been sought and issued under the very broad conception of patentable subject matter articulated in State Street
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.160 That
157. See Software Directive, supra note 5, at 45. Other functional design
elements of programs, apart from interfaces, may be eligible for patents. There
is less need, however, for firms to patent program structure in the EU, since
the Directive provides such a thick layer of protection for program internals.
Developers can create such internals without concomitant disclosure requirements. Cf. BAKELS & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 77, at 22; see also Pamela Samuelson, Economic and Constitutional Influences on Copyright Law in the
United States 4 –10 (Oct. 20, 2000) (SSRN Working Paper Series), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=234738 (explaining the differences between European and American protection of software).
158. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 278.
Reinforcing this interpretation of the Software Directive is a provision in a directive proposed by the European Commission that defined the relationship
contemplated between it and the 1991 directive: “The rights conferred by patents granted for inventions within the scope of this [software patent] Directive shall not affect acts permitted under Articles 5 and 6 of [the Software] Directive . . . on the legal protection of computer programs by copyright, in
particular under the provisions thereof in respect of decompilation and interoperability.” Robert Bray, The European Union “Software Patents” Directive:
What Is It? Why Is It? Where Are We Now?, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 11,
¶ 22 (2005) (emphasis omitted). Thus, if it was lawful under the 1991 directive
to reverse engineer a program to access interface information and to use that
information to develop an interoperable program, this provision suggests those
acts would still be lawful after adoption of the software patent directive. By
implication, reuse of interfaces could not be blocked by patents because interfaces are ideas and principles. Although the European Parliament ultimately
rejected the proposed software patent directive, see id. ¶ 27, it remains to be
seen whether the courts will interpret the Software Directive as precluding
patent as well as copyright protection for program interfaces.
159. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 283.
160. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356–58 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (discussing State
Street).
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decision considered everything under the sun made by humans
to be patentable subject matter as long as it produces a “useful,
concrete, and tangible result.”161 Program interfaces, as human-made designs that result in information being exchanged
across ICT system boundaries, seemingly produced a useful,
concrete, and tangible result.
The Federal Circuit has, however, recently repudiated the
State Street conception of patentable subject matter. This occurred after several members of the U.S. Supreme Court questioned the Federal Circuit’s overbroad view of patent subject
matter,162 which was plainly inconsistent with prior Supreme
Court rulings.163 Seemingly emboldened by the higher court’s
questions, the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) resumed
its earlier practice of rejecting applications for claiming unpatentable subject matter.164 The Federal Circuit has recently affirmed PTO rejections of three patent claims on subject matter
grounds,165 including one en banc ruling that a method for
161. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373.
162. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Lab. Corp. v. Metabolite
Labs., 543 U.S. 1185 (2005), to review the patentability of a method of measuring the amount of a certain chemical in a patient’s bloodstream for the purpose
of diagnosing the patient with a vitamin deficiency. The Court ultimately decided that the writ had been improvidently granted, apparently because the
subject matter issue had not been presented cleanly below. Lab. Corp. v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. 926 (2005). However, Justice Breyer wrote a powerful
dissent, joined by two other Justices, that questioned the Federal Circuit’s patentable-subject-matter standard. Lab. Corp. v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S.
124, 136–37 (2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting). He concluded that a literal reading
of State Street’s standard would lead to the granting of patents for processes
that the Court has found unpatentable. Id. Several Justices also asked questions about patentable-subject-matter during the oral argument in another
recent patent case before it. See Pamela Samuelson, Software Patents and the
Metaphysics of Section 271(f), 50 COMM. ACM, June 2007, at 15, 18–19.
163. See Brief for Consumers Union, Electronic Frontier Foundation, &
Public Knowledge for Hearing En Banc as Amicus Curiae at 22–24, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (2008) (No. 07-1130), available at http://www.eff.org/files/CUEFF-PK-Bilski-Amicus.pdf (asserting that State Street is inconsistent with the
Court’s patentable subject matter jurisprudence).
164. Since 2006, the PTO has rejected numerous applications for failure to
claim patentable subject matter. See, e.g., Ex parte Yang-Huffman, No. 20072130, 2007 WL 2899992, at *2 (BPAI 2007) (rejecting a claim for a method for
dynamic configuration of information); Ex parte Gosby & Ito, No. 2007-3941,
2007 WL 2843739, at *2 (BPAI 2007) (rejecting a claim for a method of document analysis and retrieval); Ex parte Gutta, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d 1536, 1537 (BPAI
2007) (rejecting a claim for a method for evaluating closeness of two items).
165. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (concluding that
a method for conducting arbitrations through the use of legal documents is an
unpatentable process); In re A.C.M. Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1348 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (holding that an encoded signal is unpatentable subject matter).
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hedging the risk of price fluctuations for commodities claimed
unpatentable subject matter.166 The Federal Circuit decided
that for a claim to satisfy the subject matter requirement, it
must either be “tied to a particular machine or apparatus” or
transform an article from one physical state to another.167
It is too early to know whether these changes in subject
matter standards will make interface patents vulnerable to patentability challenges, but this is possible insofar as they are
for methods of representing data, methods of calculating numbers, or methods of information exchange.168 The Federal Circuit is, however, very unlikely to rule that software innovations
are per se unpatentable, as they can be tied to machines and
have transformative effects.169 Consequently, interface patents,
insofar as they are for technological processes, will probably be
no more vulnerable to subject matter challenges than other
technical innovations. U.S. courts are also unlikely to be
swayed by policy-based arguments for excluding interfaces essential to interoperability from patent protection.170
Congress could, of course, legislate an exclusion of interfaces from patent protection.171 But at this point, there is insufficient momentum or consensus in the U.S. policy arena about
the importance of interoperability or patents as an impediment
to interoperability. It is thus likely that Congress would consider excluding patents for interface innovations in order to facilitate interoperability.172
166. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (abrogating
State Street). That the Federal Circuit is not yet of one mind about standards
for patentable subject matter is evident from the five opinions in that case.
However, it is notable that all but one of the twelve judges believed that Bilski’s method was unpatentable. Id. at 976–98 (Newman, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 954.
168. See Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 45, at 1032–62 (setting
forth arguments against the patentability of such inventions).
169. The Court might decide that program code is unpatentable subject
matter and reaffirm the unpatentability of broad abstract algorithms, as in
Benson. However, functional designs and processes embedded in software, including interface techniques, are likely to remain patentable subject matter.
170. See, e.g., Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d
1295, 1310 (affirming the injunction for infringement of a patent on an interconnection technique against the leading VoIP provider, and rejecting the argument that damages would adequately protect Verizon’s interests).
171. See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Remedies under Patents on Medical and
Surgical Procedures, 78 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 789 (1996) (discussing
congressional proposals to exclude medical and surgical procedures from patent subject matter).
172. In the free and open source software community, there is a strong con-
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One commentator has, however, proposed to limit the exercise of interface patents through use of a fair use balancing
test.173 A first factor would consider the nature of the alleged
infringer’s advance of the art, under which makers of complementary products would be more favored than makers of competing platforms.174 The purpose of the alleged infringer’s use
would be a second factor, under which reverse engineering to
make a new product would be more favored than the marketing
of a direct competing product.175 A third factor would assess
whether market failure had inhibited licensing, under which
courts would pay attention to the patentee’s reasons for refusing to license the interface patent or whether externalities had
produced market failure.176 The impact of a fair use ruling on
incentives to invest in innovation and social welfare would be a
fourth factor.177 A fifth factor would focus on how much of an
advance over the prior art the patented interface innovation
represents.178 A finding of fair use would in some cases result
in the alleged infringer’s being able to make free use of the invention, although sometimes the use might be “fared.”179

cern that interface and other software patents are threatening to the viability
of this sector of the software industry. See, e.g., Amy Kucharik, Lingering Patent Threats Worry Open Source Experts, LINUXWORLD, Feb. 16, 2005, available at http://searchenterpriselinux.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid39_
gci1059267,00.html; Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure, Software Patents in Action, http://eupat.ffii.org/patents/effects/index.en.html (last
visited Apr. 28, 2009) (providing a compilation of news stories and case studies
illustrating the impacts of software patents on the software industry, some
giving examples of software patents that have impeded interoperability).
173. See O’Rourke, supra note 96, at 1203–09.
174. See id. at 1230.
175. See id. at 1230–31.
176. Id. at 1231 (“[A] refusal to license application developers is more suspect than the refusal to license the maker of a competing operating system.
Failure to license application developers is both particularly troubling and
likely to occur when the patentee also competes in the application market . . . .”).
177. Id. at 1233–34. Prof. O’Rourke argues that there will generally be
high social benefit with little market harm when the infringer has developed a
complementary product. Makers of directly competing products would not necessarily be excluded from being deemed fair users, but courts should assess
the potency of network effects and whether the patentee has already reaped
substantial rewards. Id.
178. In particular, Prof. O’Rourke recommends that courts consider whether the patentee is exerting disproportionate leverage given the level of innovation in the interface. Id.
179. Id. at 1234 –35. That is, the fair user would have to pay a royalty to
the patentee.
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A third possible strategy for restricting interface patents is
to allow them to issue, but deem their use noninfringing if essential for achieving interoperability. During the period when
the European Parliament was considering whether to adopt a
directive on patenting of software-related inventions, a proposal was made that use of any patents that “read” on interfaces
should be deemed noninfringing insofar as there was no equally
efficient or effective alternative nonpatented way to achieve interoperability.180 The European Parliament did not adopt a
software patent directive, so this provision was not adopted.181
While no similar legislative proposal has been introduced
in the U.S. Congress, there is legislative precedent for immunizing socially productive uses of patented techniques.182 Section 287(c) of the U.S. Patent Act immunizes doctors from liability for using patented medical or surgical procedures to treat
patients.183 If a strong social consensus developed in favor of in180. The proposed Article 6a provided: “Member States shall ensure that
wherever the use of a patented technique is needed for the sole purpose of ensuring conversion of the conventions used in two different computer systems
or networks so as to allow communication and exchange of data content between them, such use is not considered to be patent infringement.” See Bray,
supra note 158, ¶ 22.
181. Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure, European Parliament Says No to Software Patents, http://wiki.ffii.org/Ep050706En (last visited Apr. 28, 2009).
182. See H.R. 2365, 110th Cong. (2007) (providing that taxpayers, tax practitioners, and related professional organizations would be immune from liability for use of any patent on a tax planning method); see also H.R. 5638, 110th
Cong. (2007) (proposing immunity from patent infringement liability for firms
supplying repair parts).
183. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2006). This provision was adopted after the American Medical Association and several other organizations of physicians lobbied
for immunity after a surgeon was sued for infringing another surgeon’s patented technique for cataract surgery. Mossinghoff, supra note 171, at 795–97.
Mossinghoff believes this immunity provision is compatible with U.S. obligations under the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). Id. Article 30 of TRIPs allows WTO members
to create “limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests
of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.” WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 332 (1971), http://www.wto.org/
english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf. Because the overwhelming majority of patents in respect of medical procedures are owned by biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms, none of which sue doctors for treating patients, Mossinghoff
argues that § 287(c) does not conflict with the normal exploitation of these patents. Mossinghoff, supra note 171, at 796–797. But see Emily C. Melvin, Note,
An Unacceptable Exception: The Ramifications of Physician Immunity from
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teroperability, Congress might well adopt a similar rule for
immunizing use of patents as to interfaces essential to interoperability.184
Finally, one commentator has argued that owners of patents on interfaces should be deemed to have misused patents
insofar as they use the patents as lock-out devices.185 Nintendo’s success in asserting its patented authentication method to
stop Atari Games from making and selling games that could
run on the Nintendo platform was, in her view, an unlawful extension of the patent’s scope since, in essence, it created an unlawful tying arrangement between the Nintendo console and
Nintendo-licensed games.186 The patent covered only the authentication technique, not the games or consoles; yet, Nintendo was able to exercise the patent to control the making and
selling of games for the platform, even though the games were
not within the scope of the patent.187 The patent on this small
but crucial component of Nintendo’s ICT system conferred power over many innovations that were well beyond the patent’s
scope.
B. ADJUSTING PATENT POLICY LEVERS AFFECTING
INTEROPERABILITY AND OTHER PATENT REFORMS
There are several ways that patent rules can be tailored to
lessen risks that patents on interface techniques will impede
interoperability. One example would be to heighten the standard of nonobviousness for ICT interface patent claims.188 This
proposal recognizes that firms may seek patents for interface
designs for anticompetitive purposes, that is, as a tool for blocking competitors from developing compatible platforms (e.g.,
game consoles) and for controlling the market for complementary products (e.g., videogames that run on the patentee’s platMedical Procedure Patent Infringement Liability, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1088, 1089
(2007) (challenging both the wisdom of § 287(c) and its compatibility with
TRIPs).
184. It may be more difficult to justify an interoperability exception to enforcement of interface patents under TRIPs, however, because a normal exploitation of such patents may include licensing them.
185. Cohen, supra note 116, at 1182–83.
186. Id.
187. Misuse of an interface patent would render it unenforceable against
those who bypassed the lockout system, such as AG. So under Cohen’s proposal, Nintendo would not have been able to enjoin AG, even if it literally infringed the patent. Id.
188. Id. at 1152–81.
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form).189 To ensure that patents are being issued only to truly
inventive interfaces, the PTO could apply an “innovative programmer” standard to judging patentability.190 Under this
standard, fewer interface patents would likely issue.
Although patents on ICT interfaces have not (yet) been
subjected to a higher nonobviousness standard, patent examiners sometimes do scrutinize some patent applications more
closely than others. Business method patent applications, for
instance, are reviewed by a “second set of eyes” as a precaution
against issuing patents on obvious business methods or on
overbroad claims.191 Other commentators have shown that
many policy levers in patent law are available to respond to industry-specific considerations.192 The PTO probably has inherent authority to scrutinize interface patents more carefully
than others. If the PTO came to perceive interface patents as
potentially being sought for anticompetitive reasons, that
might well justify a closer look.
A second, though more indirect, way to tailor patent rules
to facilitate interoperability would be to treat reverse engineering of an ICT interface for the purpose of obtaining access to interface information as noninfringing.193 Some commentators
have recommended allowing firms to reverse engineer program
code to facilitate the development of interoperable programs,
even if it was necessary to use a patented invention in the
course of reverse engineering.194 A number of patent doctrines
189. Id. at 1152–53.
190. Id. Cohen thinks that the 10NES patent would have been invalid under this heightened standard. Id. at 1153, 1162.
191. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method
Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 994 –95 (2003) (discussing legislative proposals to raise the level of scrutiny of business-method patents). John
Allison and Emerson Tiller mention that The Business Method Patent Improvement Act, H.R. 5364, 106th Cong. (2d Sess. 2000), initially called for
heightening the nonobviousness standard for business method patents. Id.
192. Burk & Lemley, supra note 75, at 1630.
193. It is, of course, a separate question whether reimplementing the interface or other patented design in a follow-on product would infringe the patent.
With traditional manufactured products, one can purchase an instance, take it
apart, and study its internal design without worrying about patent infringement. One cannot reverse engineer computer software, however, without making patented components embodied in it. Prof. O’Rourke has argued that even
reimplementation of a patented interface could be deemed fair use. See
O’Rourke, supra note 96, at 1230–35.
194. See Cohen et al., supra note 76, at 16–37. “Reverse engineering promotes the fundamental patent policies of disclosure and enablement, ensures
that patents will not be leveraged to protect unprotectable components of
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could serve as possible bases for this policy,195 given that the
social interest in promoting interoperability is no less important in patent law than in copyright and trade secrecy law.196
Another doctrinal development that would promote greater
ICT interoperability would be judicial refusal to enforce antireverse engineering clauses of license agreements insofar as
these agreements conflict with public policies favoring interoperability in intellectual property law.197
Requiring more meaningful disclosure about interface
techniques in any patent for them would also promote interoperability. In theory, reverse engineering should be unnecessary
to discern interface innovations, as the patent should reveal information necessary for someone skilled in the art to make
them. However, it is well-known that patents for software innovations generally disclose relatively little.198 Firms may
claim the interface technique at high levels of abstraction so
that an ordinary programmer would not be able to create interoperable components because the interface implementation
details are kept as trade secrets.
To respond to this concern, patent examiners could be more
rigorous about requiring meaningful disclosure as to interface
techniques. Yet, for already issued interface patents, some reverse engineering may be necessary to extract interface information. Such reverse engineering to obtain information that
should have been disclosed in the patent should not be deemed
infringing.
software, preserves the balance sought by the intellectual property system as
a whole, and also helps patentees to enforce their rights.” Id. at 22; see also
O’Rourke, supra note 96, at 1212.
195. Cohen et al., supra note 76, at 29–37 (exploring limitations on patent
protection for experimental uses, implied license, and exhaustion of rights doctrines as possible bases for interoperability-based defenses to patent infringement claims).
196. Id. at 27–28. Julie Cohen and Mark Lemley also recommend a narrow
scope for the doctrine of equivalents in software-related patent cases, to address widespread and legitimate concerns about the low quality of patents in
this field. Id. at 37–56.
197. See, e.g., Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 85, at 1626–30; see also
David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal
Preemption of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53
U. PITT. L. REV. 543, 555–58 (1992); Mark I. Koffsky, Note, Patent Preemption
of Computer Software Contracts Restricting Reverse Engineering: The Last
Stand?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1160, 1160 (1995). But see Bowers v. Baystate
Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (affirming enforcement of
an antireverse engineering clause in a software shrinkwrap license).
198. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN ET AL., PATENT FAILURE, chs. 7, 9 (2008).
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Certain patent reform measures could also ensure that patents on interface designs do not unduly interfere with interoperability. Especially useful would be implementation of two
important patent reforms recommended by the Federal Trade
Commission and National Academies of Sciences: 1) a reinvigoration of the nonobviousness standard for attaining patent protection,199 and 2) a more cost-effective way to challenge invalid
patents than the litigation and re-examination procedures under current patent law.200
These two reforms are interlinked because when the nonobviousness standard is too low, some patents will have issued
that should not have; yet the cost of litigation is so high, that
some invalid patents may not be challenged that should be. In
KSR Int’l, Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,201 the Supreme Court rejected the
Federal Circuit’s test for nonobviousness—which required proof
of a “teaching, suggestion, and motivation” in the prior art—as
insufficiently rigorous.202 Unfortunately, many patents were issued under the earlier standard. There is thus an urgent need
for a cost-effective post-grant review system to allow those who
have strong arguments about patent invalidity to pursue them
without the need to resort to lengthy and costly patent litigation. Post-grant review has, indeed, been a key component of
the patent reform legislation that has been pending before
Congress in recent years.203
While reinvigorating the nonobviousness standard and an
improved post-grant review process are reforms that are not
specifically aimed at interface patents, there is reason to think
that these reforms would be particularly useful to challenge
“bad” interface patents. As noted in Part I, firms have incentives to seek patents for interfaces, even when they embody tri-

199. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALCOMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 10–12 (2003) [hereinafter FTC Report].
200. Id. at 7–8.
201. 550 U.S. 398 (2007). A patent reform reinvigorating the nonobviousness standard would have been difficult to achieve in Congress because patent
lawyers and various industry groups have profoundly different views on how
rigorous the nonobviousness standard should be. The Supreme Court’s KSR
decision, though, seems to have achieved this reform in patent law; there has
been no effort to reverse the Court’s decision through further legislation. See,
e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Patent Reform Through the Courts, 50 COMM. ACM,
Feb. 2007, at 19.
202. KSR, 550 U.S. at 419.
203. H.R. 2365, 110th Cong. (2007).
ANCE OF
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vial or arbitrary differences from the prior art in order for the
firm to have strong exclusionary rights against others.
Apportionment of damages based on the value of the technical contribution of the patented invention might also have
implications for lowering the risk of substantial liability as to
minimally innovative interface techniques.204
C. EMPLOYING LIABILITY RULES FOR USE OF INTERFACE
PATENTS
Some commentators and policymakers have called for a
liability rule approach to patents on interfaces.205 This would
allow unlicensed persons to implement patented interfaces to
achieve interoperability as long as these persons offered reasonable compensation to the patentee. A liability rule approach
can be implemented in a number of ways.
One commentator has proposed that courts should withhold injunctive relief for infringement of patents on interfaces
essential for interoperability.206 He draws upon the Supreme
Court’s ruling in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.207 which
rejected the Federal Circuit’s rule that courts must virtually
always issue injunctions in patent cases.208 The Court in eBay
observed that under traditional principles of equity, injunctions
should not issue unless the plaintiff shows that 1) it has suffered irreparable injury, 2) remedies at law are inadequate to
compensate it for the injury, 3) a remedy in equity is warranted
in view of the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and

204. The IT industry has strongly supported apportionment of damages in
patent cases so that “only [the] economic value properly attributable to the patent’s specific contribution over the prior art” would be awarded. See Patent
Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 5(b)(2) (2007). This proposal has,
however, proven to be controversial. See, e.g., Posting of Dennis Crouch to Patently-O,
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/05/patent_reform_2_1.html
(May 25, 2007, 07:21 EST).
205. For a discussion of liability verses property rules in respect of information resources, see Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or
Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783 (2007); J.H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable
Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743 (2000). See also Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–11 (1972).
206. See Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH.
L. REV. 39, 104 (2008).
207. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
208. Id. at 393–94.
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defendant, and 4) the public interest would not be disserved
thereby.209
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in eBay, which was joined
by three other Justices,210 recognizes that some firms nowadays
use patents “as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to
companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.”211
This problem is especially acute “[w]hen the patented invention
is but a small component of the product the companies seek to
produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for
undue leverage in negotiations . . .”212 In such cases, “legal
damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest.”213
In its amicus curiae brief to the Court in eBay, Nokia Corp.
focused on the risk that patents on interfaces could impede socially beneficial interoperability.214 The Federal Circuit’s rigid
rule on injunctions could, it said, “particularly encumber the
technologically sophisticated industries that fuel the national
economy’s growth” because these industries rely on “interoperability standards—which allow a manufacturer’s products to
compete with or complement a competitor’s products—[that]
promote the progress of the ‘useful Arts.’”215 Licenses “typically
benefit everyone: the patent owner receives a steady stream of
reasonable royalties from the entire industry using the standard, and consumers reap the benefit of a competitive playing
field that would otherwise be severely constrained . . .”216 But
holders of patents on interoperability standards can potentially
“hold an industry hostage by demanding crippling royalties.”217
Infringers of patents on interoperability standards should be
eligible for compensation under eBay, Nokia argued, but not injunctive relief.
209. Id. at 391.
210. Id. at 395. Justices Breyer, Souter, and Stevens joined in the opinion.
Id.
211. Id. at 396.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 396–97. The President of the EU has reportedly also endorsed
the discretionary issuance of injunctions in patent infringement cases based
on considerations of equity. See IBM CORP., THE SOFT IP AGENDA—A VIABLE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY PATENT 1 (2008).
214. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Nokia Corp. in Support of Petitioners at 4,
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130 ), 2006
WL 235005.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 12.
217. Id.
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In accord with this argument, one commentator recommends that courts deny injunctions when “1) the infringed patent claims an infrastructural invention; 2) the infringer is actually using the patented invention in an infrastructural
manner; and 3) the patented invention is not reasonably available through licensing.”218 Patents on interfaces essential for
interoperability are among the infrastructural inventions that
should meet this test.219 This proposal aims to be “an actionforcing mechanism that will motivate patentees to come to the
negotiating table and rationalize the balance of power once
they get there”220 because they will no longer have the leverage
of an assured permanent injunction to obtain excessive rents
for use of their infrastructural inventions. The public interest
will be served, he argues, because the invention can be used to
enable interoperability, but the patent holder will also be compensated for the use.
Japanese policymakers have taken a different approach to
establishing a liability rule for patents essential to interoperability. In 2005, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and
Industry (METI) established a “Study Group on the Legal Protection of Software and Promotion of Innovation,” which expressed serious concerns about the exclusionary potency of interface patents.221 The Study Group’s Interim Report noted
that “[i]n the software sector, which is multi-layered, communication-enabled and with a tendency to have a lock-in effect on
users, the granting of patents may create unduly powerful exclusive rights.”222 Even though the Study Group recognized
that most patents are exercised in a manner that promotes innovation, it observed that interface patents posed risks of adverse effects on innovation.223 The Study Group encouraged the
use of Creative Commons-type licensing for patents affecting
218. See Lee, supra note 206, at 46; see also Frischmann, supra note 140, at
956.
219. See Lee, supra note 206, at 46.
220. Id. at 109. There are two other ways that a liability rule could be implemented as to interface patents. Prof. O’Rourke has proposed development of
a fair use defense in patent law that might result in a payment of royalties to
the interface patent holder. See O’Rourke, supra note 96, at 1233–34. The U.S.
government could also exercise its power to practice patented inventions and
to authorize others to do the same, subject to an obligation to compensate the
rights holder for the use under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006) or under its eminent
domain powers.
221. See ISID INTERIM REPORT, supra note 4.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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interoperability, but also recommended compulsory licensing
and enhanced application of antimonopoly law as policy responses to such patents.224
Two years later, METI published its “Interpretive Guidelines on Electronic Commerce and Information Property Trading,” which announced that a refusal to license patents essential for interoperability may constitute an abuse of intellectual
property rights.225 “[W]here a software provider holding a high
market share has exclusive rights in connection with the technology related to interoperability/interfaces (even more significantly if such technology has been standardized), this tends to
maintain the monopolized market conditions and undermines
the incentives for innovation due to its adverse competitive effect[.]”226 Whether a particular refusal to license an interface
patent is an abuse of IP rights will, however, be determined
through a comprehensive assessment of the facts on a case by
case basis, taking many factors into account.227
A third liability rule approach to interface patents was
proposed during the debate over the proposed European directive on the patentability of computer-implemented innovations.228 The Foundation for Free Information Infrastructure
(FFII) urged the European Parliament to adopt its proposal to
require owners of patents on interfaces indispensable to achieving interoperability to license such patents on reasonable and
nondiscriminatory (RAND) terms.229

224. Id.
225. JAPANESE MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE, AND INDUS., INTERPRETATIVE
GUIDELINES FOR ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND INFORMATION PROPERTY TRADING 192–193 (2007) (Tentative Translation), available at http://www.meti.go
.jp/english/information/data/IT-policy/interpretative_guidelines_on_ec070628
.pdf.
226. Id. at 193 n.36.
227. Id. at 196. METI offered the following examples of potential harm
from interface patents: patents that implicate interoperability of software
supporting “critical infrastructure”; “universal software that is widely used in
our society”; information services “in which particular individuals participate,”
such as online auctions; and where if the system is disabled by an interface
patent, it will “damage not only [ ] the developer of the information system,”
but also the operators of the online business and users of its services. Id. at
201 n.51.
228. See Bray, supra note 158, ¶ 16.
229. FOUNDATION FOR A FREE INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, PLENARY
AMENDMENTS TO THE PROPOSED SOFTWARE DIRECTIVES 2–3 (2005). This proposal was not included in the Council’s March 2005 common position. See
Bray, supra note 158, ¶¶ 27–28.
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A fourth liability-rule initiative that would affect interface
patents, although it is not directly aimed at them, is a proposed
European “Soft IP” right.230 Under it, firms could apply for a
European Community-wide patent without having to pay for
the patent to be translated into all EU languages, but the Soft
IP patent would only give the owner the right to compensation
for use of the patent, not a right to exclude.231 Lawyers for IBM
hope that this regime will be adopted and widely used by firms
seeking patents on interfaces and other software-related inventions.232
D. INVOKING COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST LAW TO FACILITATE
INTEROPERABILITY
Competition and antitrust authorities have sometimes
scrutinized the practices of dominant firms that have thwarted,
or attempted to thwart, the development of compatible technologies. The European Commission has twice invoked competition law as a regulatory tool for facilitating interoperability of
ICT systems.233 The first arose when the Commission initiated
a case against IBM Corp. in the 1980s, and the second when
the Commission took action against Microsoft in the early years
of the twenty-first century.234 The latter case resulted in the
Commission ordering Microsoft to provide information necessary to interoperability to developers of competing technologies.235 Microsoft was also forced to disclose information about
its interfaces and license IP rights in them as a remedy for violating U.S. antitrust laws in the 1990s.236
Although this Article will discuss the Microsoft cases at
some length, a brief review of the IBM case is worthwhile, as it
informed the Commission’s intervention in favor of interoperability during the time that the Software Directive was being
230. See, e.g., James Nurton, IBM Flies Soft-IP Community Patent Plan,
MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, July 31, 2007, http://www.managingip
.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=1398998.
231. Id.
232. Telephone Interview with David Kappos, Vice President & Assistant
Gen. Counsel for Intellectual Prop., IBM Corp. (Apr. 23, 2008).
233. Cf. F.M. Scherer, Microsoft and IBM in Europe, 84 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. 65, 65–66 (Jan. 23, 2003) (providing an overview of the two
cases).
234. See id.
235. Commission Decision, supra note 6, at 299–300.
236. New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76 app. at 269 (D.D.C.
2002).
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developed.237 The IBM case also affected the Commission’s perception of the competitive harms likely to flow from Microsoft’s
withholding of interface information from Sun and others and
of the likely competitive benefits of forcing Microsoft to disclose
information about its communications protocols to its competitors.238
During the heyday of its dominance of the computer industry, IBM bundled its proprietary hardware, software, and peripherals together and treated interfaces as trade secrets.239
IBM’s insistence that its customers buy bundled systems and
its refusal to provide interface information to other firms impeded the development of interoperable components and systems.240 Even after IBM started unbundling software and peripherals, under pressure from antitrust authorities,241 it did not
publish its interfaces, but rather licensed them as trade secrets
on royalty-bearing terms.242 Although licensing interface information did facilitate the development of IBM-compatible
technologies, IBM upset many of its licensees by making frequent changes to its interfaces, which caused the licensees’
previously compatible technologies to be less compatible or
wholly incompatible.243 European competition law authorities
237. The key sui generis provisions of the Software Directive—the recital’s
characterization of interfaces essential for interoperability as ideas and principles and Art. 6’s authorization of decompilation for purposes of achieving interoperability—were legal innovations derived from the Commission’s Competition Directorate. See Software Directive, supra note 5, at 44 –45; cf. Alan K.
Palmer & Thomas C. Vinje, The EC Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Software: New Law Governing Software Development, 2 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 65, 71–78 (1992) (providing the procedural history of the Software
Directive). The initial draft of the Directive did not contain these provisions.
Cf. id. at 67–71 (discussing the initial drafts of the Software Directive).
238. Cf. Commission Decision, supra note 6, at 198–200 (referring to a previous case against IBM in justifying the order in the Microsoft case); Scherer,
supra note 233, at 65–66 (discussing similarities between the Commission’s
case against Microsoft and its earlier case against IBM over delayed disclosures of and changes to interfaces).
239. See Maria Lillà Montagnani, Predatory and Exclusionary Innovation:
Which Legal Standard for Software Integration in the Context of the Competition versus Intellectual Property Rights Clash?, 37 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 304, 310 n.17 (2006) (“[I]n the earlier IBM cases, more relevance was given to trade secrets law, since IBM, after having integrated accessories, used to refuse to disclose the new interfaces by claiming them as secret.”).
240. Id. at 312.
241. See BAND & KATOH, supra note 18, at 22 n.30.
242. Id.
243. See Montagnani, supra note 239, at 310–11 (discussing allegations
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charged IBM with abusing its dominant position by, among
other things, changing interfaces in a manner that rendered
IBM-compatible peripherals inoperable.244 IBM settled the lawsuit by agreeing to pre-disclose changes to its interfaces to aid
other firms in adapting their products in a timely manner.245
A decade or so after the IBM case, the European Court of
Justice handed down the Magill and IMS Health decisions that
established that a dominant firm’s refusal to license IP rights
can, in exceptional circumstances, constitute an abuse of dominant position under EU competition law.246 Magill and IMS
Health establish a four-part test for determining whether such
exceptional circumstances exist: 1) the IP at issue must be “indispensable for carrying on a particular business,” 2) the refusal to license must be likely to “eliminate all competition in a
secondary market,” 3) the refusal to license must “prevent[] the
emergence of a new product for which there is potential consumer demand,” and 4) “the refusal [was] not objectively justified.”247
The Commission applied and adapted this test in its competition law proceeding against Microsoft in the early 2000s.248
that IBM had engaged in predatory innovation); see also In re IBM Peripheral
EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965, 1003–04 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (peripheral makers charged that IBM’s changes to interfaces were anticompetitive because they thwarted compatible products). Industry groups made similar claims against Microsoft to the EC. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v.
Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 282.
244. See Montagnani, supra note 239, at 310–11.
245. IBM also tried to block firms, notably Fujitsu, from developing platforms capable of interoperating with applications written for IBM computers.
See BAND & KATOH, supra note 18, at 27–28. IBM twice charged Fujitsu with
unlawful copying of IBM programs, including interfaces, although the cases
settled. See, e.g., Stork, supra note 44, at 243–47. IBM’s ability to prosper
notwithstanding its facilitation of Fujitsu’s competing platform seems to have
given the Commission confidence that requiring Microsoft to supply interface
information to its competitors would not undermine its ability to recoup its
R&D investments. Cf. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R.
II-3601 ¶ 709–11 (“IBM’s commitment to the Commission in 1984 was not
substantially different from what Microsoft was ordered to do.”).
246. Case C-418/01, IMS Health v. NDC Health, 2004 E.C.R. I-5039, I5087–88; Joined Cases C-241 & 242/91, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Comm’n,
1995 E.C.R. I-743, I-759 (the “Magill” case).
247. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 ¶ 116;
see also François Lévêque, Innovation, Leveraging and Essential Facilities: Interoperability Licensing in the EU Microsoft Case, in ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND
COPYRIGHT: EU AND US PERSPECTIVES 103, 104 (François Lévêque & Howard
Shelanski eds., 2005) (providing the Magill/IMS Health test).
248. The Commission adapted the Magill/IMS test in that it focused on
the refusal to license as an impediment to the development of new features

1990

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:1943

Microsoft was charged with abuse of dominant position because
it was unwilling to supply enough information and supporting
technologies to enable Sun Microsystems to adapt its Solaris
WGS-OS so that it could be fully compatible with Microsoft’s
Windows-based OS technologies, especially as to the Active Directory technologies that include protocols for synchronizing
operations among various domains, including efficient exchanges of update information, in distributed networked environments.249 The Commission asserted that Microsoft had previously supplied a relatively high level of interface information
to makers of WGS-OS technologies and that Microsoft had thereafter withheld similar information in order to gain additional
market share at the expense of its rivals, thereby abusing its
dominant position.250
In March of 2004, the Commission found that Microsoft
had a dominant position in the PC-OS market and that the information that Sun had sought from Microsoft was indispensable to Sun’s ability to remain a viable competitor in the WGSOS market.251 The Commission believed that Microsoft’s refusal
rather than to the emergence of a new product. See Lévêque, supra note 247,
at 104 –08 (discussing this adaptation).
249. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601
¶¶ 2–20. Although the Commission relied heavily on Magill and IMS Health,
the Commission’s charges were not based on Microsoft’s unwillingness to license its IPRs in the interfaces, but rather its unwillingness to supply detailed
interface information to Sun and others. Cf. id. ¶ 2 (describing Sun Microsystems’ request for “reference implementation and such other information as is
necessary to insure, without reverse engineering, that COM objects and the
complete set of Active Directory technologies will run in full compatible fashion on Solaris”). For a discussion of the Active Directory technologies and
the amount of disclosure required to implement them, see Page & Childers,
supra note 91, at 341–43.
250. See Commission Decision, supra note 6, at 157–58. Sun and other
makers of UNIX-based WGS-OS systems had initially obtained access to Windows interface information through a license Microsoft granted to AT&T to
facilitate UNIX compatibility with Windows technologies at a time when Microsoft was not in the WGS-OS market. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v
Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 ¶¶ 569–73. Once Microsoft entered that market,
it no longer had the same incentive to supply detailed interface information to
AT&T, and that license was not renewed. See id. at 573. As Page & Childers
note, Microsoft had never disclosed to AT&T or any other firm the then-newly
developed Active Directory technologies, access to which Sun sought in 1998.
Page & Childers, supra note 91, at 338–39. Information supplied under the
AT&T license facilitated emulation of the Windows NT server software, an
earlier generation technology. Id. at 339.
251. Commission Decision, supra note 6, at 146, 294. The Commission also
ruled against Microsoft on a separate charge as to abuse of dominant position
in respect to its media player software. Id. at 294–95.
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to supply this information threatened to eliminate competition
in the WGS-OS market because of powerful network effects
that were tipping this market to Microsoft’s product.252 It cited
evidence that customers preferred many features of other
WGS-OS systems; yet, Microsoft had an advantage over Sun
because customers also valued compatibility with Windows
technologies.253 Although there was no separate product whose
emergence was being thwarted by Microsoft’s product, as in
Magill, the Commission adapted the Magill/IMS Health new
product test by concluding that Microsoft’s refusal to supply interoperability information was undermining Sun’s ability to
develop new features for its WGS-OS.254 The Commission concluded that Microsoft had not shown that incentives to invest
in innovation in the WGS-OS market as a whole would be undermined if Microsoft supplied the requested interface information.255
To remedy this abuse, the Commission ordered Microsoft to
prepare sufficiently detailed specifications of its communications protocols to enable Sun and other makers of WGS-OS systems to achieve interoperability with Microsoft’s Windowsbased technologies, to provide the specifications to Sun and
others on reasonable and nondiscriminatory (RAND) terms,
and to update the information promptly as its protocols
changed.256 Microsoft was also ordered to establish an evaluation mechanism to ensure compliance with the Commission’s
order.257
Microsoft appealed the Commission’s order to the European Court of First Instance (CFI), arguing, among other
things, that the Commission had misinterpreted the interope252. Id. ¶ 980. Prof. Lévêque reasons that once Microsoft had attained a
certain market share in the workgroup server OS market, it would have an
interest in diminishing the supply of interface information; less interface information would cause its competitors’ products to interoperate less successfully. Lévêque, supra note 247, at 113–14. This, in turn, would cause customers and ISVs to be concerned about being stranded. Id. The market would then
tip to Microsoft, with network effects to finish the work of killing off the competition. Id.
253. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601
¶¶ 405–09.
254. See id. ¶¶ 631, 647.
255. Id. ¶¶ 697–98. Professor Lévêque has questioned whether it was appropriate to make Microsoft bear the burden of proof on this issue. Lévêque,
supra note 247, at 121. I agree.
256. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 ¶ 48.
257. Id.
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rability provisions of the Software Directive,258 that its ownership of IPRs, especially key patents, in the interfaces provided
an objective justification for its refusal to supply extensive interoperability information to its competitors,259 and that unless
the company had freedom to choose how to exercise its IPRs in
its protocols, it would have inadequate incentives to invest in
research and development to improve its products.260
The sharpest difference between Microsoft and the Commission lay in their contrasting interpretations of the interoperability provisions of the 1991 Software Directive. The CFI characterized the difference as whether the Directive was intended
to permit one-way or two-way interoperability.261 Microsoft interpreted the directive as aimed at facilitating one-way interoperability, that is, as intended to facilitate interoperability between the program whose interface information was being
sought (e.g., the Windows PC-OS) and complementary products
(e.g., applications designed to run on Windows).262 The Commission’s two-way theory posited that the Directive was also intended to facilitate development of functionally equivalent programs to the platform in question, such that the platform’s
competitors could successfully run programs that designed for
the platform whose interface information was at issue.263
Microsoft argued that its existing licensing programs already enabled development of complementary products, which
is all, in its view, that the Directive was intended to achieve.264
It objected to being required to give competitors extensive in-

258. Id. ¶ 121.
259. Id. ¶¶ 115–24. Microsoft claimed copyrights in interface documentation, trade secret protection for the interfaces themselves, and patents on
some communications protocols. See id. ¶¶ 112, 115, 267–73.
260. Id. ¶ 274.
261. Id. ¶¶ 108, 225–26.
262. Id. ¶ 108.
263. Robert Hart characterized one-way interoperability as enabling multivendor compatibility and two-way as enabling plug-replaceability. Cf. Robert
J. Hart, Interoperability Information and the Microsoft Decision, 2006 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 361, 361 (“[T]he Commission’s decision . . . aims to achieve
plug replaceability—a standard of interoperability to which the EC Software
Directive does not aspire. Rather, the author’s reading of the Directive is that
the goal of the interoperability . . . is a more modest one, namely multi-vendor
interoperability.”). Hart asserted that the Directive was only intended to support multi vendor compatibility. Id. The text of the Directive, however, does
not support this theory. See Software Directive, supra note 5, at 45.
264. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601
¶¶ 118–23.
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formation that would allow them to “clone” its technologies.265
Microsoft argued that this forced disclosure would be harmful
to investments in innovation in the WGS-OS market.266 Microsoft itself would have little incentive to invest in innovation if it
was forced to give its interfaces away to its competitors and be
unable to benefit from the exclusive rights conferred by IP
laws.267 Microsoft also contended Sun and other competitors in
the WGS-OS market would invest less in innovation because
the Commission’s order meant that they could benefit from the
fruits of Microsoft’s R&D without doing their own.268
In support of its two-way compatibility theory, the Commission pointed out that the critical distinction in the Software
Directive is that between interfaces and implementations.269
The Directive extends protection to the latter, but not to the
former.270 The Commission pointed out that “the word ‘interoperability,’ by its very nature, relates to a two-way relationship,” and that Microsoft’s definition “is difficult to reconcile
with the wording of the definition of interoperability [in the
Software Directive]: ‘the ability to exchange information and
mutually to use the information which has been exchanged.’”271
The Commission’s order did not require Microsoft to disclose
source code, algorithms, or other internal design details of Microsoft’s technologies, but only program interfaces.272 For this
reason, the Commission believed that competitors would not be
able to clone Microsoft’s technologies, but only to interoperate
with software developed for Windows. In the Commission’s
view, the order merely required Microsoft to comply with the
legislatively endorsed policy favoring interoperability embedded in the Software Directive.273
265. Id. ¶ 110; see also Page & Childers, supra note 91, at 333, 351–52 (asserting that the information disclosed to Samba would facilitate cloning and
explaining the basis for Microsoft’s claim that it would have to disclose certain
algorithms and other program internals to aid others in achieving interoperability with its Active Directory technologies).
266. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601
¶ 111.
267. See id. ¶ 668.
268. See id. ¶ 670.
269. Id. ¶¶ 195–99.
270. See id. ¶¶ 225–26.
271. Commission Decision, supra note 6, ¶ 758.
272. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601
¶¶ 194 –206.
273. Id. ¶ 710. The Commission took similar action against IBM. See
Scherer, supra note 233, at 65–66. That proceeding was eventually settled by
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Before the CFI, the Commission denied that Microsoft had
any IP rights in its interfaces.274 It asserted that any copyright
that Microsoft might claim in interface specification documents
would not be infringed by other firms’ implementing the interfaces in independently written programs.275 It questioned
whether Microsoft’s protocols were innovative enough to qualify
for patent protection, although it also spoke of interfaces as
ideas and principles.276 And the Commission discounted Microsoft’s trade secrecy claims because the value in this information
lay in their secrecy, not in any innovation they might embody.277 Yet, it also relied upon Magill and IMS Health as precedents holding that ownership of IP rights was not, of itself, an
objective justification for refusal to license such rights.278
Responding to Microsoft’s investment disincentives argument, the Commission asserted that Microsoft would be able to
recoup some of its R&D expenses from license fees the Commission had authorized it to charge Sun and others for disclosure
of interoperability information.279 Both Microsoft and its competitors would, in its view, have ample incentives to invest in
further improvements in their technologies in order to respond
to and fuel consumer demand.280 Because Sun and others had
IBM’s agreement to disclose interface information to other firms in advance of
releasing new systems into the market. See id. This experience informed the
Commission’s proposal for the interoperability provisions of the Software Directive. See van Rooijen, supra note 144, at 130; Palmer & Vinje, supra note
237, at 72 n.34.
274. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 ¶ 277.
275. Id. ¶ 279.
276. Id. ¶¶ 276–78. It is difficult to accept the Commission’s view that
there was no innovation in Microsoft’s Active Directory technologies, which
were at the core of the Commission’s investigation, given the substantial complexity of designing protocols for synchronizing updates among domains in distributed networked environments and the inability of Sun and others to figure
out how to implement these interfaces without information supplied by Microsoft. Cf. Page & Childers, supra note 91, at 335 (characterizing Active Directory as “one of Microsoft’s most distinctive and innovative server technologies”).
277. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601
¶ 280.
278. Id. ¶¶ 689–90.
279. See Lévêque, supra note 247, at 117–18 (discussing the challenge of
setting a “reasonable royalty” for this interface information, especially given
the nondiscrimination requirement).
280. Cf. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601
¶ 654 (providing examples of innovations that benefited both the product developer and Microsoft). But see Page & Childers, supra note 91, at 354 (concluding that disclosure of interface information to Samba would harm Microsoft’s incentives to invest in innovation).

2009]

PATENTS ON INTERFACES

1995

invested in innovative WGS-OS designs during the period when
Microsoft was supplying higher levels of interoperability information, the Commission believed that requiring Microsoft to
disclose such information would not significantly dampen its or
its competitors investments in innovation in the future.281
In September 2007, the CFI affirmed the Commission’s order, holding that 1) the Commission’s interpretation of the
Software Directive was sound;282 2) under Magill and IMS
Health, ownership of IPRs was not, by itself, an objective justification for refusal to license them to others;283 3) the exceptional circumstances required by Magill and IMS Health had
been satisfied;284 and 4) Microsoft had failed to prove that its
incentives to invest in innovation would be diminished by the
order, saying that the firm had provided only “vague, general,
and theoretical arguments” in support of this claim.285 The CFI
pointed out that it was standard industry practice to license interface information,286 and that Microsoft itself had agreed to
provide interface information in settling litigations against it in
the United States.287 The Commission’s order was, moreover,
consistent with the Software Directive and the IBM settlement
in a similar competition case in the mid-1980s.288 Microsoft decided not to appeal the CFI ruling.289
Since then, Microsoft has disclosed considerable amounts
of interface information under the Commission’s order.290 How281. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601
¶ 658; see also Ashwin van Rooijen, The Role of Investments in Refusals to
Deal, 31 WORLD COMPETITION: L. & ECON. REV. 63, 69–70 (2008) (discussing
the investment incentives analysis in the CFI Decision in Microsoft).
282. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601
¶¶ 225–26.
283. Id. ¶ 678.
284. Id. ¶¶ 690–91.
285. Id. ¶¶ 697–701.
286. Id. ¶¶ 702, 710. Neither the Commission nor the CFI clarified whether
it was a common industry practice for developers to disclose interface information to makers of functionally equivalent products, or only to developers of
complementary products. The Commission should have provided some empirical data to support the implicit claim that both kinds of licenses were common.
287. Id. ¶ 703.
288. Id. ¶ 710.
289. See Press Release, Microsoft Corp., Microsoft Statement on Compliance with European Commission 2004 Decision (Oct. 22, 2007), http://
www.microsoft.com/Presspass/press/2007/oct07/10-22MSStatement.mspx.
290. See Stephen Castle, Microsoft Gets Record Fine and a Rebuke from
Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2008, at C3 (reporting that Microsoft had published 30,000 pages of previously secret source code for the Windows operating
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ever, the Commission fined Microsoft $1.35 billion for failing to
provide sufficiently detailed interoperability information.291
Microsoft and the Commission have also had on-going disagreements over the level of innovation embodied in its interfaces—Microsoft, unsurprisingly, claims to have developed very
innovative interfaces, and the Commission has argued they are
mundane—which might affect the price which Microsoft can
charge licensees for providing interoperability information.292
Key differences between U.S. and EU antitrust/competition law
cast doubt on whether U.S. antitrust authorities would pursue
or U.S. courts would uphold similar claims against Microsoft.
One of the theories underlying the Commission’s proceeding
against Microsoft seems to be that Microsoft’s interfaces are an
“essential facility” which Microsoft, as the dominant firm with
control over access to that facility, was obliged, by virtue of its
market power, to allow others access on fair and nondiscriminatory terms as long as doing so would not cause undue congestion or the like in providing access to that facility.293
The viability of the “essential facility” doctrine as a matter
of U.S. antitrust law is uncertain after the Supreme Court decision in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP.294 Even assuming that Trinko did not deliver a
death blow to that doctrine,295 U.S. courts would likely be more
sympathetic to Microsoft’s claims that it was justified in refusing to license interface information because of its IP rights in
the interfaces and that unless it is able to recoup its R&D expenses, it will have too little incentive to invest in innovation.296 U.S. courts have thus far been unwilling to hold that a
system to comply with the Commission’s order, yet the Commission was unimpressed due to multiple unfulfilled promises to produce the code earlier).
291. Id.
292. Scott M. Fulton, III, EU Threatens to Fine Microsoft for Lack of Innovation, BETANEWS, Mar. 1, 2007, http://www.betanews.com/article/EU_
Threatens_to_Fine_Microsoft_for_Lack_of_Innovation/1172764299.
293. Lévêque, supra note 247, at 103–10, 120–21 (discussing the Commission’s essential facility theory).
294. 540 U.S. 398, 398–99 (2004) (holding that Verizon’s unwillingness to
provide certain services to local exchange competitors did not violate the antitrust laws). The Court took into account that Congress had already provided
rules for access and the Federal Communications Commission and state regulators engage in close regulatory oversight of such matters. Id. at 411–13.
295. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Refusals to License Intellectual Property
After Trinko, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191, 1207–08 (2006); see also van Rooijen,
supra note 281, 63–77 (comparing U.S. and EU case law on essential facilities
and refusals to deal).
296. See, e.g., Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407–08.
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refusal to license IPRs to competitors is a violation of the U.S.
antitrust laws.297
There is, however, some similarity between the Commission’s order in Microsoft and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.298 In both cases, there was a history of sharing resources by competitors that
had grown the market for both; at some point the dominant
party withdrew from cooperation in a manner that seemed to
lack an independent business justification.299 It is conceivable
that U.S. courts, in an appropriate case, would take into account that network effects in the software industry can tip the
market to a single provider, not so much because of the intrinsic innovation in its interfaces, but rather because network effects kick in once the developer’s interface becomes a de facto
interoperability standard. Trinko relies heavily on the notion
that it is important to preserve incentives to invest in creating
the market for the facility said to be essential, and that is as it
should be.300 In network industries, however, network effects
themselves may provide powerful incentives for firms to invest
in becoming the de facto interface standard.
While a refusal to license IP rights has never, of itself, been
deemed an antitrust violation in the United States, courts have
sometimes ordered antitrust violators to license IPRs and/or
disclose nonpublic information, such as interface specifications,
to competitors.301 The consent decree settling the U.S. antitrust
case against Microsoft in the 1990s, for example, required Microsoft to disclose interface information and license pertinent
IPRs to firms that might want to use them, even though U.S.
antitrust authorities had not charged Microsoft with having
297. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Unilateral Refusals to License in
the US, in ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS, supra note 247, at 12, 27–
30.
298. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
299. Id. at 609–11.
300. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407.
301. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, Designing Antitrust Remedies for Dominant Firm Misconduct, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1285, 1304 –05 (1999) (giving examples of licenses induced by antitrust oversight). This article was published as
part of a symposium issue of the Connecticut Law Review on the remedy challenges posed by United States v. Microsoft Corp. See Robert M. Langer, Symposium Introduction: United States v. Microsoft, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1245, 1247
(1999); see also SOFTWARE & INFO. INDUS. ASS’N, ADDRESSING THE MICROSOFT
CHALLENGE—RESTORING COMPETITION TO THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY (1999),
http://www.manishin.com/pressdocs/siia.pdf (providing a comprehensive analysis of remedy alternatives).
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misused any patents on its interfaces or refused to license IPRs
in its interfaces to competitors.302 U.S. antitrust officials persuaded the judge overseeing the settlement to take a “forwardlooking” approach to thwart possible Microsoft efforts to maintain the firm’s monopoly in the Windows OS market by restricting access to interface information.303
One option that would have given other firms more access
to Windows’ interfaces would have been to require Microsoft to
license its source code to those who wanted to make interoperable programs.304 Although this would have promoted greater
interoperability, some expressed concern this remedy would be
more generous to competitors than was warranted by the antitrust violations.305 A second option was to require Microsoft to
disclose and license interface information to firms wanting to
develop interoperable technologies. Microsoft agreed to the latter in settling the U.S. antitrust case.306
U.S. antitrust authorities and the European Commission
have been frustrated in their efforts to promote competition
through forced disclosure of interface information because compulsory licensing of IPRs and/or knowhow, such as interface information, is challenging as an antitrust remedy. It requires
close oversight as to exactly which IPRs must be licensed, how
much detailed information must be transferred, how timely updated information must be provided, and how long the duty to
license IPRs or supply information will need to last.307 The European Commission and Microsoft, for instance, disagreed
about how much disclosure was required.308 Disclosure of interface information under the U.S. consent decree has not accom-

302. See William H. Page & Seldon J. Childers, Software Development as
an Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the Enforcement of the Microsoft Communications Protocol Licensing Requirement, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 77, 83 (2007) (discussing this “forward-looking” approach). Some states
that also sued Microsoft for antitrust violations had sought more comprehensive disclosure of interface information, id. at 84 –87, but the judge overseeing
these cases rejected the more expansive interface disclosure request. Id. at
103–08.
303. Id. at 83.
304. Jonathan Zittrain, The Un-Microsoft Un-Remedy: Law Can Prevent
the Problem That It Can’t Patch Later, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1361, 1371 (1999).
305. Id. at 1372.
306. New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 171–72 (D.D.C.
2002).
307. Kovacic, supra note 301, at 1304.
308. See supra notes 296–98.
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plished its intended objective of bringing about more competition in the PC-based OS market.309
While remedies in the United States v. Microsoft Corp. case
were being hotly debated, some commentators were skeptical
that requiring Microsoft to disclose interface information would
reduce its dominance in the OS market; in retrospect, this
skepticism seems warranted. Some argued instead for a structural remedy, such as breaking Microsoft up into one firm that
developed OS software and another that developed applications; the former could then license the OS interface specifications to the latter on equal footing with other applications providers.310 Among the difficulties with this proposal was that it
would require legal authorities to make difficult judgments
about what “belongs” in an OS and what “belongs” in applications, which they lacked expertise to assess.311
Alternatively, some favored breaking Microsoft up into
multiple companies (“Baby Bills”), each of which would develop
Windows OS technology and license interfaces to applications
providers. This might have produced more competition in the
OS market, but it risked fragmentation of the OS, which
seemed likely to lead to greater development costs and a loss of
benefits to consumers and applications developers of a single de
facto interface standard.312
Yet another alternative for resolving conflicts over IPRs in
and disclosures of interface information was invented in the
mid-1980s during an arbitration of a IPR dispute between IBM
Corp. and Fujitsu over the OS software that Fujitsu made that
was fully compatible with (and a functional equivalent to)
IBM’s OS for its System 360/370 computers.313 Fujitsu had sold
IBM-compatible OS software for mainframe computers without
objection from IBM from the mid-1970s until 1982.314 Then
309. See, e.g., Page & Childers, supra note 302, at 83–84, 126–36.
310. See, e.g., Kovacic, supra note 301, at 1294 –304 (discussing proposed
structural remedies).
311. Zittrain, supra note 304, at 1370–71.
312. See, e.g., Stan J. Liebowitz, Breaking Windows: Estimating Some
Costs of Breaking up Microsoft Windows, 32 UWLA L. REV. 137, 139–40
(2001). But see Robert J. Levinson et al., The Flawed Fragmentation Critique
of Structural Remedies in the Microsoft Case, 46 ANTITRUST BULL. 135, 135–38
(2001); see also STAN J. LIEBOWITZ, A FOOL’S PARADISE: THE WINDOWS WORLD
AFTER A FORCED BREAKUP OF MICROSOFT (2000) (responding to Levinson et
al.).
313. See Stork, supra note 44, at 242–47, for a more detailed explanation of
the background of the IBM-Fujitsu dispute and arbitration.
314. Id. at 243.
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IBM charged Fujitsu with having misappropriated IP rights in
its OS.315 Fujitsu asserted that it had only appropriated public
domain and unprotectable elements from IBM’s programs.316
Although IBM and Fujitsu settled this first dispute in 1983,
key terms were left undefined and the compromise soon broke
down.317 Arbitration ensued.318 One of the difficulties confronting the arbitrators was that the scope of copyright protection in
computer programs was unclear at that time.319 Rather than
attempting to resolve this IPR issue, the arbitrators proposed a
forward-looking solution, a key element of which was a “clean
room” approach to obtaining essential interface information.320
Under the regime established during the IBM-Fujitsu arbitration, IBM, in exchange for an agreed upon royalty payment
from Fujitsu, was obliged to deliver source code for any new releases of its OS to a “secured facility” operated by a special set
of Fujitsu employees.321 Fujitsu’s “clean-room” team would then
analyze the source code and extract interface information.322
Upon compiling the information essential to Fujitsu’s ability to
continue to develop IBM-compatible OS software, IBM sent a
team to review the compiled interoperability information.323
When it signed off that Fujitsu’s team had only extracted interface information, not other innovations in the IBM software,
the clean-room team would then transfer the interface information to the Fujitsu OS development team so that they could
reimplement the interfaces in Fujitsu’s own independently developed programs.324
In a suitable antitrust case involving misuses of IPRs in interfaces and refusals to disclose interface information, a court
might want to consider a similar “clean room” and licensing regime as that which settled the IBM-Fujitsu dispute more than
315. Id.
316. Id. at 243–44.
317. Id. at 244 –45.
318. Id. at 245.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 246.
321. Id.; see also Robert H. Mnookin, Creating Value Through Process Design: The IBM-Fujitsu Arbitration, 47 ARB. J. 6, 9–10 (Sept. 1992).
322. See Stork, supra note 44, at 246.
323. See Mnookin, supra note 321, at 10.
324. Id. at 10. The arbitrators retained authority to resolve any further
dispute between IBM and Fujitsu over the exchange of source code and interface information; there were, however, no further serious disputes, as the parties had adequate incentives to cooperate with this procedure. Id. at 11.
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two decades ago. This is admittedly a costly way to facilitate interoperability, but it does have some advantages: it avoids
wasteful rounds of bickering over how much information the
firm must disclose and it places some of the burden of obtaining
the information on the firms that want to develop functional
equivalent programs.325
E. PROMOTING PRIVATE ORDERING AS TO INTERFACE PATENTS
Because many ICT industry participants are aware of the
high exclusionary potency of interface patents, several private
sector initiatives have focused on development of policies to ensure that patents on ICT interfaces will be exercised so as to
promote interoperability rather than to thwart it. This is especially important when an interface technique, such as a communications protocol, is under consideration for formal adoption as a standard.
One noteworthy initiative has been the policy promulgated
by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) which requires
member firms to agree that if they own patents that “read” on
any standard adopted by W3C that is essential to interoperability on the Web, those patents must be licensed on a royalty-free
(RF) basis.326 The initial impetus for adoption of this policy was
a claim that the W3C’s Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P)
standard infringed a non-W3C-member’s patent.327 Although
the W3C concluded that the P3P standard did not infringe that
patent, senior officials realized that the W3C would likely be
faced with other patent claims affecting its standards. After extensive deliberations, the W3C decided to adopt an RF policy as
to standards essential to Web interoperability, concluding that
this policy was the optimal way to promote the continued
progress of the open Web.328
The Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) does not mandate RF licensing of
325. See Page & Childers, supra note 302, at 112–26 (discussing many difficulties encountered in determining how much information Microsoft was obliged to disclose under the consent decree).
326. W3C PATENT POLICY WORKING GROUP, W3C PATENT POLICY §§ 3.1, 5
(Daniel J. Weitzner ed., 2004), http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy20040205/. The policy does, however, contain a procedure whereby one can attain an exclusion from the RF commitment. See id. § 4.
327. See Daniel J. Weitzner, Standards, Patents and the Dynamics of Innovation on the World Wide Web pt. II (Nov. 1, 2004), http://www.w3.org/2004/
10/patents-standards-innovation.html.
328. Id. at pt. III.
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essential interface patents owned by member firms which become OASIS standards.329 OASIS provides, instead, several licensing options. OASIS seems to have been influenced by the
W3C policy, for it developed more than one RF licensing option
for TCs operating under OASIS’ aegis; yet, it also allows TCs to
adopt policies that commit holders of patented technologies
adopted as standards to license them on RAND terms.330 OASIS now requires TCs to announce at the time of TC formation
which IP policy they have adopted. Interestingly, the overwhelming majority of TCs formed since this new policy was put
in place have adopted RF policies for applications and web services standards approved by OASIS.331 Patents on interface
components of OASIS standards are, therefore, generally available on RF terms.
Although RF policies for interface patents do not make
such patents unenforceable, they substantially reduce the leverage that the patents would otherwise provide their owners as
well as their economic value. This, in turn, dampens incentives
to acquire such patents. Free and open source developers nonetheless sometimes object to W3C and similar RF policies, on the
ground that these licenses include some restrictions that are
incompatible with the practices of this community.332
The overwhelming majority of SSOs that adopt standards
affecting the ICT industry require members who participate in
standard-setting processes to disclose any patents they own
that are essential to any standard under consideration by that
SSO.333 Most also require a pre-commitment to licensing such

329. See OASIS, OASIS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS POLICY § 4
(2008), http://www.oasis-open.org/who/intellectualproperty-2008-05-02.pdf (describing three IPR modes including RAND, RF on RAND Terms, and RF on
Limited Terms).
330. See id.
331. Interview with Robert J. Glushko, OASIS Board Member, in Berkeley,
Cal. (Apr. 22, 2008).
332. See, e.g., FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, FSF ’S POSITION ON W3 CONSORTIUM “ROYALTY-FREE” PATENT POLICY (2003), http://www.gnu.org/
philosophy/w3c-patent.html (expressing objection to field-of-use restrictions
that limit practice of the patented idea to those precisely specified as set forth
in the license).
333. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting
Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1904 –05 (2002) (implicitly requiring disclosure of all essential patents through requirement to disclose all patents
known).
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patents on RAND terms.334 So interface patents that have been
adopted as standards will generally be available under RAND
licenses, even if not on RF terms.335
Another private sector initiative that fosters interoperability in the patent-intensive landscape of the ICT industry is the
Open Invention Network (OIN), a patent pool recently formed
by several major IT industry firms to build a portfolio of software patents that support open source software projects.336
OIN “acquires patents and makes them available royalty-free
to any company, institution or individual that agrees not to assert its patents against the Linux System.”337 The OIN pool acquires software patents of all kinds, including some that cover
valuable interfaces.338 Other similar pools seem to be forming.339 Some firms are, moreover, making unilateral commitments not to enforce certain interface patents.340
334. Id. at 1906. However, there are sometimes disputes about what “reasonable” means. See id. (describing a lack of guidance to what “reasonable and
nondiscriminatory licensing” terms actually mean).
335. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) have IP policies that require essential interface standards to be made available on RAND terms. See SCOTT
BRIM, GUIDELINES FOR WORKING GROUPS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES
§ 5.6 (2004), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3669.txt (describing IETF ’s goal of helping a working group choose a technology and offering guidelines for the
process including proposed licensing terms); ETSI, ETSI Rules of Procedure:
Annex 6 ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy, in ETSI DIRECTIVES 34, 37
(2009), http://portal.etsi.org/directives/25_directives_jan_2009.pdf. ETSI defines ESSENTIAL as: ‘ESSENTIAL’ as applied to IPR means that it is not
possible on technical (but not commercial) grounds, taking into account normal technical practice and the state of the art generally available at the time
of standardization, to make, sell, lease, otherwise dispose of, repair, use or operate EQUIPMENT or METHODS which comply with the STANDARD without infringing that IPR. ETSI IPR Policy FAQs, http://www.etsi.org/
website/AboutETSI/LegalAspects/IPR_Policy_FAQ.aspx (last visited Apr. 29,
2009).
336. See
Open
Invention
Network,
About
OIN,
http://www
.openinventionnetwork.com/about.php (last visited Apr. 29, 2009); Open Invention
Network,
Members,
http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/
about_members.php (last visited Apr. 29, 2009).
337. See Open Invention Network’s Patent License Agreement,
http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/pat_license.php (last visited Apr. 29,
2009).
338. The Meltzer patent, discussed supra note 107, for example, is part of
the OIN pool. See Open Invention Network’s Currently Owned Patents, http://
www.openinventionnetwork.com/pat_owned.php (last visited Apr. 29, 2009).
339. See, e.g., François Lévêque & Yann Ménière, Copyrights Versus Patents: The Open Source Software Legal Battle, 4 REV. ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 27, 42–43 (2007); Hank Barry, Attorney, Howard Rice Nemerovski Canady Falk & Rabkin, Presentation at the Berkeley Center for Law &

2004

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:1943

In addition to the patent pools and unilateral commitments
mentioned above, it is a common practice in the ICT industry
for firms to cross-license their patent portfolios.341 Some interface patents are within these portfolios. The pervasiveness of
cross-licenses in the ICT industry is yet another check on potentially abusive exercise of patents. These and other private
initiatives cannot, of course, blunt the force of all interface patents that might impede interoperability, which is why some
nations have adopted or considered more interventionist strategies.
III. WHAT IS THE RIGHT POLICY RESPONSE TO
INTERFACE PATENTS ESSENTIAL TO
INTEROPERABILITY?
Anyone who reviews the extensive literature discussing
policy options for responding to the exclusionary potency of ICT
interface patents would get the impression that patents on interfaces must be very serious impediments to interoperability.
Part II has shown that this literature offers more than twentyfive suggestions for regulating interface patents in order to
achieve more compatibility among ICT systems. Within this
framing, the only question seems to be which of the many options would best accomplish this objective.
If one begins the inquiry instead by surveying the vast array of ICT systems deployed in the modern world, it becomes
evident that interoperability is prevalent, even if not ubiquit-

Technology Symposium: Intellectual Property and Entrepreneurship Conference (Mar. 8, 2008).
340. Lévêque & Ménière, supra note 339. Sun and Microsoft, for instance,
have cross-licensed their patent portfolios. See, e.g., Press Release, Microsoft
Corp., Microsoft and Sun Microsystems Enter Broad Cooperation Agreement:
Settle Outstanding Litigation (Apr. 2, 2004), http://www.microsoft.com/
presspass/press/2004/apr04/04 -02SunAgreementPR.mspx. Sun could, therefore, have lawfully implemented the Active Directory protocols at issue in the
European Commission’s action against Microsoft without worrying about patent infringement; the problem was that Sun did not have access to the relevant interface information, not that Microsoft had refused to license the patents. E-mail from David Heiner, Vice President & Deputy Gen. Counsel,
Microsoft Corp., to the author (May 13, 2008) (on file with the author).
341. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 95, at 35–36 & n.123,
73–74; Robert P. Merges, IP Rights and Technological Platforms (Berkeley
Ctr. for Law & Tech., Working Paper No. 64, 2008), http://repositories.cdlib
.org/bclt/lts/64/ (proposing that many market factors provide incentives for interoperability and arguing that ex post measures are superior to ex ante regulations).
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ous.342 Market incentives, driven in large part by the potential
for generating network effects, are often strong enough to induce many firms either to publish ICT interfaces without IP restrictions or to license interface information on reasonable
terms. Many interface patents are licensed through crosslicensing arrangements common in ICT industries. Insofar as
SSOs have adopted patented interfaces as standards, licenses
are likely to be available under either RF or RAND terms.343
The more fundamental the interfaces are to the functioning of
key infrastructures, such as the World Wide Web and web services, the more likely the patents are to be available on RF
terms.344
This is not to say that patents on interface designs never
impede interoperability. Nintendo was, after all, able to block
Atari Games from making and selling games for its NES console because of the patent it obtained for an authentication mechanism.345 That case was, however, decided fifteen years
ago.346 Very few reported cases since then have involved ICT
interface patents whose exercise was impeding interoperability.347
342. See, e.g., GASSER & PALFREY, supra note 1, at 5–9.
343. But see Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 93, at 2042–43 (suggesting that
royalty caps or “step-down” royalties are better alternatives to RF and RAND
licensing arrangements but suffer from raising “antitrust flags”).
344. Owners of patents on interface techniques may, of course, not be
members of the W3C, OASIS, or other SSOs, and hence not committed to the
RF or RAND policies of those organizations. See supra notes 332–39 and accompanying text. Private initiatives to foster interoperability through SSO
policies may thus not be a complete solution to the interoperability problem.
When SSOs learn of a patent that might “read” on an interface design that is
under consideration as a standard, they may be able to design around it.
There is, of course, greater risk of holdup if the design has already become a
standard, and industry leaders have already implemented the design in their
products. In circumstances where irreversible commitments have been made
to an interface standard covered by an outsider’s patent, courts may award
reasonable royalties for infringement instead of injunctive relief. See eBay v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396–97 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(explaining that in similar cases “legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest”).
345. See supra Part I.D.
346. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 832 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
347. It is possible that some firms have given up on ICT development
projects because they were unable to license interface patents; it is, however,
impossible to know how often this has happened. Litigation is an imperfect
indicator of patents as impediments to interoperability. However, I expected to
find more cases in which patents were being asserted to thwart compatibility

2006

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:1943

Some anecdotal evidence exists as to open source software
projects that did not go forward because of interface patents.348
Yet, even open source projects have been able to implement
some patented interfaces. Samba and Microsoft, for example,
were able to reach an agreement on Samba’s use of certain
network communications protocols.349 (Of course, Microsoft’s
willingness to license these protocols to Samba on GPL-friendly
terms was due in large part to the Commission’s oversight of
Microsoft’s interface licensing practices.350) It is a fair inference
that organizations, such as W3C, OASIS, and METI, would not
have undertaken their policy initiatives to blunt the exclusionary potency of interface patents if these organizations thought
such patents would never or only rarely present impediments
to interoperability.
Nor is it to say that patents will not become a bigger impediment to interoperability in the future. FFII has expressed
concern that Microsoft will undo the European Commission’s
ruling by seeking ever more patents on interfaces.351 Yet, even
if Microsoft gets more patents on interface techniques, there is
no reason to believe that Commission will be any more deferential to those patents than it was to the patents raised in the
2004 proceeding. Microsoft was not able to persuade the CFI
that courts should be more deferential to a firm’s refusal to license technological IPRs, such as patents on interfaces, than to
refusals to license copyrights.352 The Commission and the CFI
because would-be interoperators would likely challenge the validity of interface patents in hopes of using the techniques if the patentee was either refusing to license the patents or demanding unreasonable terms.
348. See, e.g., Andy Tai, Microsoft Prohibits GPLed Work Via Licensing of
CIFS Standards, ADVOGATO, Apr. 5, 2002, http://www.advogato.org/article/
453.html.
349. See, e.g., Microsoft and Samba Finally Come to Terms Over Windows
Protocols, http://blogs.zdnet.com/microsoft/?p=1064 (Dec. 20, 2007, 12:49 PST).
Microsoft was initially willing to license patents on two network communications protocols (U.S. Patent No. 5,264,261 and 5,437,013) to Samba on RF
terms. Samba insisted it must be able to use the General Public License (GPL)
for its software; Microsoft objected to this. However, the final agreement allowed Samba to use the GPL for the software implementing the Microsoft patented protocols. Id.
350. See Page & Childers, supra note 91, at 333 (characterizing the Microsoft-Samba license as “by far the most important tangible outcome of the European Microsoft case”).
351. See Press Release, Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure,
Microsoft Will Trump EU Competion Ruling with Patents (Sept. 17, 2007),
http://press.ffii.org/Press_releases/Microsoft_will_trump_EU_competition
_ruling_with_patents (describing recent patents obtained by Microsoft).
352. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 693
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regard competition law as an appropriate means to monitor a
dominant party’s use of IP to impede interoperability. In the
United States, courts are more likely to evolve doctrines within
patent law to respond, as needed, if patents are impeding socially desirable interoperability.
The eBay decision provides U.S. courts with a basis for
awarding reasonable royalties to owners of patents instead of
injunctions for interfaces essential to interoperability.353 This
approach may be more likely if the patent would block access to
widely used infrastructures,354 although it is noteworthy that
the Federal Circuit was inhospitable to Vonage’s argument that
an injunction should not issue to block its use of Verizon’s patented interface because of the impacts of the injunction for
millions of users of its VoIP services.355 In the post-eBay caselaw thus far, injunctive relief has generally been withheld only
in cases that appear to involve “patent trolls.”356
It is, however, erroneous to construe eBay as confining
judicial discretion to withhold injunctive relief to patent-trolllike cases. eBay held that courts should carefully consider in all
IP cases the same four factors traditionally used in making
judgments about whether to order injunctive relief.357 Nokia’s
amicus brief in eBay made a strong argument about why injunctive relief should be withheld in cases involving patents on
interfaces essential to interoperability.358 Courts should be es(refusing Microsoft’s argument without the presence of the exceptional circumstances identified in Magill and IMS Health).
353. See supra notes 212–26 and accompanying text.
354. See supra Part II.C.
355. See Verizon Servs. Co. v. Vonage Holdings Co., 503 F.3d 1295, 1310–
11 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[A]ffirming the district court’s decision to issue an injunction . . . .”).
356. See Benjamin H. Diessel, Note, Trolling for Trolls: The Pitfalls of the
Emerging Market Competition Requirement for Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases Post-eBay, 106 MICH. L. REV. 305, 312–22 (2007). Courts may be
wary of awarding damages in lieu of injunctions because of the difficulties that
typically attend price-setting by nonmarket actors through compulsory licenses, especially as applied to developers of competing platforms. Id. at 342–
43. If an interface patentee deliberately stays outside of a standard setting
process that is likely to implicate its IPRs in order to avoid a RAND commitment, courts might find this an appropriate case in which to award damages
but not injunctive relief, as this may be seen as troll-like behavior.
357. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (“[A]
plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before
a court may grant such relief.”).
358. Brief of Nokia Co. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at *2, eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2006 WL
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pecially receptive to a damage-based remedy if an interface patent covers one small component of a complex multi-component
technology so that, in effect, an injunction would result in
thwarting interoperability as to components not covered by the
patent.359 It is also conceivable, although somewhat less likely,
that U.S. courts will adopt the fair use defense proposal discussed above to balance the patent holders’ and public interests
at stake in cases involving patents affecting interoperability.
U.S. courts are, however, unlikely to rule that a firm’s refusal to license an interface patent constitutes patent misuse,
even if the claim was wrapped in the language of tying arrangements.360 The U.S. Patent Act specifically provides that
refusing to license patents is not misuse.361 Nor are U.S. courts
likely to treat a refusal to license an interface patent or to disclose interface information as an antitrust violation, even if the
license or disclosure is necessary to achieving interoperability.362 In the aftermath of Trinko, it is doubtful that U.S. courts
would regard ICT interfaces as essential facilities, refused

235005 (“[T]he decision below threatens to thwart the innovative and procompetitive work of standard-setting organizations.”).
359. General Electric, for instance, claimed patent rights in a method and
system for transferring images from an ultrasound system to third-party storage and printing systems. See U.S. Patent No. 6,210,327 (filed Apr. 3, 2001).
Use of that method and system was essential for commercial viability of any
business of making and selling diagnostic ultrasound machines. GE sued Sonosite for infringing this patent, although it eventually dropped this claim. Interview with Ted Sichelman, Research Fellow, Berkeley Center for Law &
Technology, in Berkeley, Cal. (Aug. 22, 2008).
360. See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text for Prof. Cohen’s argument as to why the Nintendo lock-out system was patent misuse. But see, In
re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(holding that a patentee can lawfully refuse to license third parties who want
to make replacement parts). One might argue that treating lock-outs as misuse is less likely after enactment of the anticircumvention rules of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act because it privileges use of technical protection
measures (TPMs) to protect copyrighted works. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006); see
Randal C. Picker, Copyright and the DMCA: Market Locks and Technological
Contracts, in ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS, supra note 297, at 181
(noting how the DMCA violates content locks). Yet, some cases have interpreted the anticircumvention rules narrowly to preclude lock-out TPMs that
do not cause copyright infringements. See, e.g., Chamberlain Group, Inc. v.
Skylink Tech., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“We conclude that 17
U.S.C. § 1201 prohibits only forms of access that bear a reasonable relationship to the protections that the Copyright Act otherwise affords copyright
owners.”).
361. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2006).
362. See supra notes 300–03 and accompanying text.
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access to which violates U.S. antitrust law.363 Of course, a firm
that has otherwise violated the antitrust laws may, as in United States v. Microsoft, be required to license patents and provide interface information as part of the remedy.364
This Article endorses withholding injunctive relief in an
appropriate case in which an interface patent is essential to
achieving interoperability and compensation would allow the
patentee to recoup its R&D expenses; it also endorses some patent reform measures discussed in Part II.B. There is, however,
at this time too little empirical evidence that patents are such a
major impediment to interoperability to justify adoption of
stronger policy measures,365 such as excluding interfaces from
patentable subject matter or immunizing the use of patented
363. It is certainly possible that U.S. antitrust and patent misuse law may
evolve to regulate interface patents in the future if such patents emerge as
substantial impediments to interoperability and threaten the viability of competition in the ICT industry. U.S. courts have given relatively little consideration to the power of network effects in ICT systems and how this interacts
with proprietary control over interfaces. If U.S. patent and antitrust officials
become concerned with consumer harms arising from exclusionary uses of patents, this might justify U.S. policymakers moving toward an EU-style regulation of how dominant parties exercise IPRs. U.S. courts are likely, however, to
be more concerned than the Commission and CFI were to the chill on incentives to invest in innovation that forced disclosure of interfaces and licensing
of patents may bring about. See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407–08 (2004) (“Compelling such firms to
share the source of their advantage is in some tension with the underlying
purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive for the monopolist,
the rival, or both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities.”).
364. See supra Part II.D.
365. I recognize the dangers of embracing the null hypothesis. Yet, consider
the paucity of litigation about interface patents and even of anecdotal evidence
of interface patents as impediments to interoperability. I spoke at length with
ICT industry experts from small and large firms expecting to find many examples of patents as impediments to interoperability and was surprised at
how few emerged. Widespread cross licensing in the IT industry, RF and
RAND commitments for patented standards, and many examples of successful
licensing of interface patents support my conclusion that the evidence at
present of patents as significant impediments to interoperability is relatively
weak. See Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software: Do Property Rights Still Matter?, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 10 (2006) (discussing the
“widespread use of cross licensing”). It is also worth noting that there is not
just one software industry, but many software industries focused on different
market sectors, and many software sector markets are relatively small. While
an interface patent may be asserted to thwart interoperability in some niche
markets, the larger or wider the software market, the more likely it is that
cross licensing or SSO policies will blunt the exclusionary potency of interface
patents. More systematic empirical research might, of course, identify problems arising from interface patents, such as allowing patentees to extract
royalties out of proportion to the value of the innovation.
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interfaces to achieve compatibility.366 While there are good reasons to question the suitability of patents as a form of IP protection for computer program innovations,367 insofar as patents
are available for software inventions, it is difficult to justify
withholding them from interface techniques, as long as they
meet patent law’s substantive standards. Interfaces enable the
development of new features of ICT systems and are inextricably connected to the innovative features they enable.368
Even though some interface designs are inventive and costly to develop, it would be rational for a nation to decide, as the
EU arguably did, that interfaces essential to interoperability
are “ideas” or “principles” that should be unpatentable as a sui
generis matter. Patent incentives may not actually be necessary
to bring interfaces into existence.369 Developing software without interfaces is like building a house without windows or
doors.370 Although it can be done, there is little point in doing
it, as ICT technologies are generally more useful when they in366. Excluding interfaces from patent subject matter would likely be difficult to monitor, as firms would almost certainly encourage their lawyers to engage in artful patent drafting to claim rights in interfaces without designating
them as such. An immunity from infringement provision as to techniques essential to interoperability would be more likely to achieve its goal. However, as
noted above, such an immunity provision would risk running afoul of TRIPs
obligations. See supra notes 188–89.
367. See Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 45, at 1031–32 (“If the
software industry neither wants nor needs the patent system in order to be a
vital and innovative industry, then, as a matter of public policy, it is sensible
not to use the patent system for the protection of program-related innovations.”); Samuelson et al., supra note 146, at 2343–47 (“The dual character of
computer programs—which are both writings and machines at the same
time—has presented some difficulties for those wanting to use patent law as a
means of legal protection for software innovations.”).
368. Thanks to Robert Barr for making this point. Barr also pointed out
that if engineers at SSO technical meetings spend hours debating which is the
most “elegant” solution to a particular technical problem when setting standards for interfaces, there must be some innovation that distinguishes one solution from another.
369. See, e.g., O’Rourke, supra note 96, at 1216 (“[B]ecause significant firstmover advantages and returns larger than those of conventional markets often
characterize network markets, investors may not need the inducement of intellectual property rights at all to encourage them to fund innovation.”). As
noted in Part II.A, a decision to exclude interfaces from patenting would likely
lead to greater reliance on trade secrecy protection. Such a rule would also be
difficult to monitor effectively since a claim may cover an interface component
without the application specifically calling it that. Interface innovations are,
moreover, likely to be tied to feature innovations, and claimed as such.
370. See David Orenstein, QuickStudy: Application Programming Interface
(API), COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 10, 2000, http://www.computerworld.com/action/
article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=43487 (making this analogy).
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teroperate with other entities.371 Firms such as Microsoft are
unlikely to cease developing interfaces or improving interfaces
if they cannot patent them. The EU could reasonably have decided that software developers would have sufficient incentives
to develop programs by the expansive protection the Directive
provides to software internals (other than interfaces) and by
outlawing decompilation except when motivated by compatibility considerations. Such expansive protection could provide adequate incentives for software development even if without protection for interfaces (which, after all, can still be kept secret).
Although the Supreme Court may revisit the patentability
of software and narrow its scope,372 this would have little impact on the patentability of interfaces insofar as they are tied to
enabling product features. The bigger challenge in the United
States, is weeding out patents on arbitrary or trivial interface
designs. This may be accomplished through a reinvigoration of
the invention standard after the Supreme Court’s KSR decision
and other patent reforms, such as an improved post-grant review regime.373
While nations should not require interface techniques to be
any more innovative than other patentable designs, patent officials would be well advised to examine claims for patents on interface techniques more rigorously than they examine other
kinds of claims and perhaps to require more meaningful disclosure of interface techniques if substantive standards of patentability are met. This greater scrutiny would be wise given that
firms have incentives to patent interface techniques less because of any innovation they might or might not embody and
more because of their exclusionary potency.
There are certainly some sectors in which there is less interoperability than one might wish for (e.g., digital music services),374 but patents do not seem to be the principal impediments to interoperability in those sectors. Firms that choose
371. Id.
372. See Pamela Samuelson, Revisiting Patentable Subject Matter, 51
COMM. ACM, July 2008, at 20, 22 (“If . . . the Federal Circuit reverses the
BPAI’s ruling in Bilski . . . the Supreme Court will probably review the Bilski
case to clarify what standards the PTO and Federal Circuit should apply in
judging which processes are eligible for patent protection.”).
373. See supra Part II.B.
374. France has undertaken regulatory efforts to bring about greater interoperability as to digital music. See L.C. Angell, French iTunes Interoperability
Law Goes Into Effect, ILOUNGE, Aug. 3, 2006, http://www.ilounge.com/index
.php/news/comments/french-itunes-interoperability-law-goes-into-effect/.
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noninteroperable business strategies, as Apple did with
iTunes,375 in order to build their own network and reap the rewards of network effects that need not be shared with other
competitors (e.g., RealNetworks), seem to be able to rely on
trade secrecy and their ability to re-engineer and re-implement
their interfaces if a competitor successfully reverse engineers
and implements an earlier interface. Patents may not be necessary for firms to succeed with business models built on noninteroperable or controlled interoperability strategies.
Lack of access to interface information is often a greater
impediment to interoperability than patents are. Should nations consider mandating disclosure interface information in
order to foster more interoperability? The EU Software Directive did not go so far. Drafters of the Directive may have believed they did enough to induce disclosure of interface information by authorizing reverse engineering for purposes of
achieving interoperability.376 They may not have anticipated
the development of very large and complex systems, such as the
Windows OS, as to which reverse engineering has become an
infeasible way to get access to interface information.377 The
Software Directive provides no remedy to would-be reverse engineers if interface information cannot be obtained by reverse
engineering.378 Even when reverse engineering does enable
second comers to obtain interface information, there may be no
legal recourse if the developer of the interface tweaks the interface and thereby thwarts unlicensed firms from attaining compatibility for more than a short time.379

375. See Scott M. Fulton, III, EU Consumer Protection Targets iTunes, BEMar. 12, 2007, http://www.betanews.com/article/EU-ConsumerProtection-Targets-iTunes/1173719408 (noting how officials in Norway challenged the legality of iTunes, in part because of its noninteroperability).
376. Software Directive, supra note 5, art. 6(1).
377. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 ¶ 362
(stating that reverse engineering was not a feasible way to get WGS-OS interface information).
378. See Software Directive, supra note 5, art. 6 (providing protection only
to the extent a program can be reverse engineered).
379. See, e.g., Bill Rosenblatt, RealNetworks and Motorola Open Apple
iTunes/iPod Stack, DRM WATCH, July 28, 2004, http://www.drmwatch.com/
drmtech/article.php/3387481 (noting how RealNetworks reproduced the file
format design of iTunes). Thereafter, Apple changed its interface and undid
RealNetworks temporary interoperability advantage. Jon Borland, Apple
Fights RealNetworks’ ‘Hacker Tactics’, ZDNET ASIA, Dec. 15, 2004, http://www
.zdnetasia.com/news/security/0,39044215,39209366,00.htm.
TANEWS,
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Nations could, of course, require developers to be more
forthcoming about interfaces, either as a sui generis matter or
as a precondition of getting patent protection for interface
techniques. Firms often prefer to maintain interface information as a secret, but nations can mandate disclosure of information if they deem it necessary to achieve public policy goals.380
Nations could also regulate those who alter their interfaces for
the purpose of making a competitor’s product noninteroperable.381
Before mandating disclosure or outlawing “predatory”
changes to interfaces, nations should reflect on the likely effectiveness of such regulation. Consider, first, the problems likely
to attend any effort to regulate interface changes. Firms frequently change the interfaces of their technologies when they
add new features to their products.382 Consumers typically benefit when new features are made available; it would be unwise
to discourage firms from evolving their products. Regulators
may be hard pressed to determine when firms have changed interfaces to facilitate new features and when they did so to harm
competition. Consider also that innovators may sometimes regard making changes to interfaces as an appropriate self-help
response to competitors who are trying to free-ride on their
platform’s success, as Apple did after RealNetworks reverseengineered iTunes interfaces to make its media player compatible with Apple’s system.383
380. See Page & Childers, supra note 91, at 351 (“The EC has required Microsoft to make disclosures sufficient to allow rivals to create server software
functionally equivalent to Microsoft . . . .”). It is as yet unclear whether
France’s effort to regulate disclosure of interface information for digital music
systems will succeed in promoting greater interoperability in the digital music
sector.
381. Some commentators have endorsed the use of antitrust law to patrol
what they call “predatory innovation.” See, e.g., Montagnani, supra note 239,
at 306–08; van Rooijen, supra note 281, at 82–83.
382. van Rooijen, supra note 144, at 136 (“[C]hange seems to be a dangerous ground for antitrust liability. Innovation necessarily involves change.”). It
is important to understand that firms often have incentives to provide “backward compatibility” so that software and documents developed for a previous
iteration of the platform can continue to interoperate with later iterations of
the platform. Firms are most likely to change their interfaces when they give
up on backward compatibility by releasing a new version of the product (e.g.,
version 3.0 may have new interfaces, though versions 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 will
have the same ones).
383. See Borland, supra note 379. Apple might well have considered RealNetworks as the predator and itself as the prey in this situation. Who is the
predator and who is the prey is, thus, not all that straightforward and may
well be contestable.
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Mandating disclosure of interface information may initially
seem a simple solution, but in practice, it too may be fraught
with difficulties. The European Commission’s effort to oversee
Microsoft’s compliance with the order to disclose interface information is a cautionary tale.384 Microsoft produced more than
thirty thousand pages of technical information;385 yet the
Commission deemed the disclosures insufficient and heavily
fined Microsoft for withholding key information.386 Determining which components of an ICT product, especially computer
programs, are functioning as an interface or are essential to interoperability may be technically very complicated and hotly
contested.
Achieving interoperability is, moreover, often a more complex technical goal than legal commentators and policymakers
have sometimes acknowledged. Even when one has plentiful
access to APIs and protocols, it can still be very difficult to
achieve interoperability.387 To make an ICT system interoperable requires fine-grained agreements on syntax and semantics.388 Ambiguities in interface specifications often make it difficult to implement APIs.389 Even when interface designs are
384. The U.S.-forced disclosure of interface information program ran into
similar difficulties. See Page & Childers, supra note 91, at 337–39.
385. Castle, supra note 290.
386. Commission Decision, supra note 6, ¶¶ 728, 731, 1078.
387. At least four kinds of technical problems can impede interoperability:
differences in content, differences in encoding, differences in structure, and
differences in semantics. Consider, for example, the following impediments to
interoperability for electronic documents representing $100. If X represents
$100 as <A>USD 100</A> and Y presents the same concept as <A>One Hundred US Dollars</A>, the discrepancy in representation of the content between
them means that messages about $100 cannot interoperate. If X encodes $100
as <Amount>USD 100</Amount> and Y encodes it as “USD,100”, the differences in encoding will similarly prevent interoperability. If X encodes $100 as
<Amount>USD 100</Amount> and Y represents it as <Currency>
USD</Currency><Amount>100</Amount>, structural differences will thwart
interoperability. Finally if X represents $100 as <Amount>USD
100</Amount> and Y represents this as <Price>USD 100</Price>, semantic
differences will thwart interoperability. GLUSHKO & MCGRATH, supra note 8,
§ 6.0.
388. Id. § 6.0. If, for example, an interface calls for location information,
interoperability may not occur if the platform is expecting GPS coordinates
and the application has encoded location information in postal codes. Similarly, an API for requesting weather information may be difficult to implement if
the entity from which it is seeking weather data has separate categories for
temperature, humidity, windspeed, and the like. With interfaces, details like
this matter a great deal.
389. Open interfaces are generally more programmer-friendly than proprietary ones because programmers who implement open interfaces are more

2009]

PATENTS ON INTERFACES

2015

well-documented and standardized, firms may still need to develop guidelines, obtain expert advice about how to comply with
them, and even to obtain access to test suites and other tools to
get the details right.390
It may thus be unwise to mandate full disclosure of interface information across the board for at least three reasons.
First, many technical difficulties attend attaining interoperability in the real world, even when one has considerable
amounts of interoperability information. Second, there is considerable imprecision about exactly what information would have
to be disclosed to achieve interoperability. Third, there is a risk
that requiring full disclosure of all minute details necessary to
achieve interoperability will undermine incentives to invest in
innovative ICT products.
Nations could, however, facilitate greater access to interface information through some more modest measures. They
might, for example, emulate the EU Software Directive by
treating license terms that forbid reverse engineering as a legal
nullity, at least insofar as the reverse engineering is undertaken for purposes of discerning information essential to interoperability.391 Nations might also recognize or create a privilege
in patent law, akin to that already recognized in copyright, anticircumvention, and trade secrecy laws, to permit reverse engineering for purposes of getting access to interface information.392
There is finally the question about whether refusals to disclose or license interface information or interface patents
should be treated differently depending on whether the wouldbe interoperator plans to develop a complementary or a functionally equivalent product or service.
The principal argument for allowing unlicensed secondcomers to use interface information to develop complementary
products, but not functional equivalents (or in the Commission’s terms, one-way, but not two-way interoperability) is that
likely to refine the specification to provide more precise substitutes for opaque
or confusing terms. Erik Wilde, What Are You Talking About?, in 2007 IEEE
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SERVICES COMPUTING 256, 258 (2007).
390. See, e.g., Page & Childers, supra note 302, at 130 (explaining that Microsoft was required to undertake the development of test suites).
391. Software Directive, supra note 5, art. 9.1.
392. See supra Part II.B. For a discussion of the interoperability exception
to the anticircumvention rules, see Aaron K. Perzanowski, Rethinking AntiCircumvention’s Interoperability Policy, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming
2009).
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there is a risk that the developer of the interface will not be
able to recoup its R&D expenses because functional equivalents
will undercut sales of that developers’ principal products (e.g.,
the platform), whereas complements are likely to build demand
for the platform.393 Establishing a reasonable royalty for licensing interface information as to developers of complementary
products will generally be easier than establishing a reasonable
royalty for licensing as to developers of functionally equivalent
products, as the platform’s provider probably has a licensing
program for development of complementary products, but probably not for functional equivalents.
However, there are some reasons why IP law should treat
interfaces the same, regardless of whether they are intended
for use in building complements or equivalents. For one thing,
in today’s complex networked world, it is no longer as easy as it
once was to distinguish between complements and substitutes.
Interfaces now enable more complex exchanges than before; a
network-based program may, for example, be acting as a complement one moment, but as a functional equivalent the
next.394 Any effort to make a sharp legal distinction between interface information for complements and functional equivalents
is thus likely to break down.395 Second, much of the information
necessary to make a complementary product is also necessary
to know to make a functional equivalent, and vice versa. This
too makes a sharp legal distinction between them problematic.
Third, it is rare in IP law to treat information as protectable for
one purpose, but not for another.396 Neither copyright nor trade
393. See Weiser, supra note 30, at 560–61 (arguing that IP law should allow unlicensed parties to develop complements, but not substitutes, at least
not until and unless the incumbent becomes a monopolist). The ability to recoup investments was the main concern Microsoft raised to the Commission
about being forced to supply highly detailed interface information to Sun.
Commission Decision, supra note 6, ¶ 274.
394. See, e.g., Lévêque, supra note 247, at 112–13 (describing how servers
and PC OS are partial complements and partial substitutes).
395. Consider this variant on Altai. Suppose Altai had reverse engineered
the compatibility component of CA-Scheduler to get access to interface information. It would have done so in order to make a program that was a functional equivalent to CA-Scheduler, but it needed the interface information
primarily in order to interoperate with the IBM OS programs with which both
Altai’s and CA’s programs were designed to run (that is, to develop a complement to the IBM platform).
396. International News Service v. Associated Press is a rare example in
which certain information (news) was treated as private property as between
INS and AP, although it was common property as to the general public. 248
U.S. 215, 235 (1918). The INS concept of “quasi-property” has been discredited
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secrecy law, for example, has distinguished between reverse
engineering undertaken to make complements or substitutes
when analyzing the lawfulness of reverse engineering and
reuse of information discerned from reverse engineering.397 Reverse-engineers frequently aim to make competing products.398
Creating a new legal distinction to allow reuse of interface information to make complements, but not substitutes, would be
a novel move for IP law. Fourth, firms sometimes adopt business strategies that do not conform to the usual platform/complement story. Nintendo, for example, lost money
every time it sold an NES console.399 Its strategy for achieving
financial success depended upon controlling the market for
complementary products (i.e., games) for this platform.400 By
selling unlicensed complements for Nintendo’s console, Atari
Games was arguably thwarting Nintendo’s recoupment strategy. Finally, there is some evidence that firms can recoup R&D
investments even when they facilitate access to interface information for developers of functionally equivalent products.401
IBM and Fujitsu, for instance, were able to coexist in supplying
functionally equivalent software for mainframe computers.
Some competition among different implementations of a platform may be beneficial to consumers who at the same time also
benefit from the platform’s stability as a de facto standard.
over time. Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and
Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38
CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 388–95 (1989).
397. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir.
1992) (agreeing with Accolade that it is fair use to reverse engineer to get information necessary to make complementary products); Sony Computer
Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that
it is fair use to reverse engineer to get access to information to make functional equivalent).
398. See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 85, at 1577 (identifying the
intention of reverse engineering to “draw customers away from the maker of
the reverse-engineered product”).
399. See id. at 1618–19 (“In the game system market, platform developers
typically lose money on sales of consoles, making up losses on sales of games
and peripherals.”).
400. Id.
401. The CFI Decision relied in part on this reasoning in responding to Microsoft’s concerns about its ability to recoup R&D expenses if forced to disclose
interface information to Sun and others. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v.
Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 710. It also relied on Microsoft’s disclosure of
interface information under the U.S. consent decree and the settlement with
Sun. Id. ¶¶ 693, 703. But see Weiser, supra note 30, at 560–68 (expressing
concerns about the ability of platform providers to recoup R&D expenses if
competitors can freely use interfaces to develop directly competing platforms).
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It is, however, noteworthy that the three most contentious
disputes over program interfaces—the European Commission’s
case against IBM in the 1980s, the IBM-Fujitsu litigation/arbitration, and the Commission’s recent case against Microsoft—all involved efforts by dominant firms to thwart competitors from making functional equivalent products, not
complements.
What we can say with some confidence is that interface patents pose the gravest risks for competition and follow-on innovation when the patents cover techniques that are essential to
interoperability, when those patents are held by firms with
market power, and when there are incentives for firms in dominant positions to exercise interface patents to exclude competitors from the market or to leverage the firm’s power in one
market to gain power in an adjacent market, especially disruptive new entrants with an entrepreneurial bent.402 Any regulatory intervention as to interface patents should only be undertaken in a targeted manner to address specific abuses, at least
until there is systematic empirical evidence that patents are, in
fact, more serious impediments to interoperability than they
seem to be today.
CONCLUSION
Interoperability among ICT components and systems is
widely viewed as socially desirable insofar as it promotes competition, innovation, and consumer choice. Because firms often
have incentives to reveal information necessary to enable others to build compatible technologies so that their platforms are
more attractive to consumers, many either do not assert IP
rights in their interfaces or license such rights on open terms.
Some firms, however, prefer to maintain interfaces as trade secrets or to seek patents for them as part of a business strategy
that is aimed at controlling which firms are able to interoperate
with their technologies. The principal advantage of patents
over trade secrecy in the protection of interfaces is that patents
confer a strong legal right to exclude others from building technologies that incorporate the patented technique. If the technique is essential to achieving interoperability, the exclusionary potency of an interface patent is considerable.
402. See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 7, at 105–19 (discussing circumstances in which leveraging power from one market to another may be rational
and anticompetitive); O’Rourke, supra note 96, at 1216 (leveraging may be a
rational strategy in network markets).
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Many commentators and policymakers have recognized
that patents on interfaces can be and sometimes have been exercised to block the development of interoperable technologies.
Out of concern about the exclusionary power of such patents,
they have proposed a wide array of legal and policy measures to
ensure that interoperability can occur. This Article is the first
comprehensive analysis of the twenty-some policy responses
that have thus far been proposed or implemented to blunt the
power of interface patents.
This Article makes four main points. First, there is less
need for strong measures, such as barring patents on interface
innovations or treating the exercise of interface patents to block
interoperability as misuse of the patents, than some commentators seem to believe. Second, insofar as interface patents do
emerge as more serious impediments to interoperability than
they have been to date, there are adequate policy responses in
place in various countries that can be used to address them.
Third, some tailoring of patent rules and patent reforms may
be advisable in order to promote greater interoperability among
ICT systems. Fourth, patents are often less of an impediment
to interoperability than the secrecy of interface information,
which may be difficult or impossible to reverse engineer, ambiguities in interface specifications, and changes in interfaces
that may be made in new versions or features of an ICT system. This Article explains why it may be difficult to bring about
more interoperability by mandating greater disclosure of interface information or regulating what kinds of changes firms can
make to their interfaces.

